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ABSTRACT 
Peer Production is an emerging model in the information age.  It takes advantage 
of greatly reduced transaction costs enabled by the combination of a networked 
information economy and ubiquitous personal computing power.  This thesis outlines 
why this new model is so significant to the U.S. Navy.  This is done in part through 
modeling and simulation in ARENA.  The model demonstrates how incomplete 
specification of agent talent and task difficulty adversely affect traditional firm 
production and cause both cost and schedule overruns as well as project failure.  
Modeling the peer production process demonstrates how a significant portion of these 
shortcomings are overcome in the new economic model.  The model also quantifies the 
significant gains in efficiency, higher probability of success, increased rate of innovation, 
and reduced cost result from PP.  Finally, we present a first look at how peer production 
can be systematically applied and reapplied successfully—through a stakeholder analysis 
and functional decomposition. 
By combining the model with the theoretical understanding of PP presented here, 
the Navy will be able to apply peer production in numerous areas, to include: advertising, 
recruiting, maintenance, casualty response, family services, health care, R&D, and ship 
construction. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This research began by challenging one of the most basic assumptions in typical 
systems procurement and development.  That assumption entails the belief that in order to 
maintain control of the design and production process one must also maintain direct 
supervisory control over the individuals performing the specific task.  This research will 
explore an alternative hypothesis: abandoning control can lead directly to increases in 
efficiency and timeliness of the development process, as well as increased relevancy and 
quality of the system being developed, or a product being produced. 
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A. ORIGIN OF THIS RESEARCH 
The Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG) is tasked 
with discovering the Warfighting strategies of the future.  Specifically, SSG XXVI's 
work focused on making these discoveries for the year 2030 with respect to cyberspace 
and the Navy.  The goal is to take the revolutionary ideas posed by the SSG and apply 
then in a manner that is relevant today.  In doing so, a clearer path from today to 2030 
can be developed. This research outlines an immediate course of action that will lead to 
the future envisioned by SSG XXVI. 
The foundation, upon which this research was built, is the SSG's definition of 
cyberspace.  The thesis conclusions do not follow from the presently accepted definition 
of cyberspace ("A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers.") found in JP 1-02.  Cyberspace was redefined by SSG XXVI (SSG XXVI 
Report, July 2007) to better encapsulate the possibilities that will be available in 2030.  
The comprehensive definition also encompasses the evolution of disruptive and 
innovative concepts expected over the next twenty years. 
This more comprehensive understanding of cyberspace leads one to think of 
human socialization and interaction as the realization of more effective communications, 
with notions that result in more effective models of social and economic behavior.  This 
is in stark contrast to a JP 1-02 cyberspace that is "controlled".  For example, human 
interactions currently available through immersive virtual environments (IVE) are 
significantly more than just digitized information transferred via networked computers 
controlled by access restrictions, protocols, and levels of trust.  In the IVE, a system of 
elements (people) and domains (affinity groups) are created or formed through a routine 
(resulting from a general modus operandi) or phylointerests (defined as the state of 
relationship between people and groups of people, resulting in resemblance in structure 
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or structural parts, Langford 2008) that attracts and absorbs the human psyche into it.  By 
doing so (the mechanism), a presence in cyberspace is created. 
SSG XXVI defined cyberspace as 
An unconstrained interaction space for human activity, relationships and 
cognition,…where data, information, and value are created and 
exchanged,…enabled by the convergence of multiple disciplines, 
technologies, and global networks…that permits near instantaneous 
communication, simultaneously among any number of nodes, independent 
of boundaries. (SSG XXVI Report, July 2007) 
It is through this understanding of cyberspace that the accomplishments, 
developments, and possibilities that have been outlined here, begin to make sense.  This 
research, like the SSG definition, focuses on the opportunities that are present through 
human interactions in cyberspace and not upon cyberspace itself.  It is through this 
understanding of cyberspace, that we can undertake predictions of where we and our 
adversaries will go in the future. 
B. HOW TO PROCEED 
The contents of this thesis is focused on two questions: (1) Can a solution that 
addresses project overruns and escalating costs of labor be characterized by a new 
economic operations model—peer production; and (2) how does peer production solve 
this problem?  To answer the first question, we will first consider descriptive information 
that focuses on a solid understanding of peer production as a concept.  In doing so, peer 
production is viewed from a number of academic perspectives.  We will then use a model 
and simulation of PP to demonstrate that it can address the aforementioned overruns and 
cost escalation.  The second question will be addressed by applying the fundamentals of 
sound Systems Engineering.  PP will be functionally decomposed to discern a repeatable 
approach for its application.  A stakeholder analysis will also be presented to describe the 
critical players in making PP successful.  Finally, some applications for PP within the 




A tough new business rule is emerging: Harness the new collaboration or 
perish.  Those who fail to grasp this will find themselves ever more 
isolated—cut off from the networks that are sharing, adapting, and 
updating knowledge to create value. 
       Tapscott & Williams, WIKINOMICS  
A. DEFINITION OF PEER PRODUCTION 
Peer Production (PP) is an economic model of production on par with firm and 
market production methodologies (Benkler, 2006, p. 107).  PP is executed through an 
Internet based, coordinated effort of volunteers who contribute project components.  PP 
incorporates some process to combine project components into a unified intellectual work 
(Krowne, 2005, p. 6).  The realm of PP is knowledge, information, and culture; or in 
more general economic terms, PP creates non-rival goods. 
This definition encapsulates PP rather succinctly but it also oversimplifies the 
concept significantly.  This thesis begins with this definition as a point of reference.  
From this starting point, PP is described as the third economic model of production 
alongside the firm and market methodologies.  PP is then developed into a model of 
production that can be applied by the Navy in numerous areas such as maintenance, 
advertising, R&D, and recruiting. 
B. EXAMPLES OF PEER PRODUCTION 
Table 1 is provided as a demonstration of the breadth of well-known projects and 
tools that utilize PP techniques.  The table gives a brief description of how the listed 
examples use PP with respect to the definition given in the previous section.  In most 
cases, the example is not solely a product of PP but rather a combination of computing 
power, proprietary development, and PP.  The common thread among the examples is 






The aspect of the Google search engine that sets it apart from other search engines is the way it 
ranks results.  Its ranking system is comprised of three equally important components.  Without 
any one of them the search engine would not work.  One of these components is a product of 
peer production.  Google considers how many Web pages link to a particular site to determine 
its relevance.  Each link is produced by, in this case, an unknowing peer.  Google compiles the 
links into a cumulative work that ranks Web page relevancy (Brin & Page, 1998). 
InnoCentive InnoCentive is a Web-based enterprise that uses peer production to solve previously unsolvable 
engineering challenges for its clients.   Obviously, InnoCentive could not solve these problems 
if they were truly unsolvable.  Rather these challenges were only unsolvable with the resources 
available to the client "in house".  By pooling together the individual resources and talents of 
anonymous Internet users, InnoCentive matches problems with individuals able to solve them. 
MMORPGs Massively Multi-Player Online Role Playing Games are the most successful genre of video 
games ever created.   Collectively they have hundreds of millions of players worldwide.  The 
popularity of these games is due to the application of a PP methodology.  MMORPGS are 
designed to be unwinnable by an individual player.  They require coordination and cooperation 
among a multitude of players with different skills to accomplish the necessary tasks in the 
game.  It is this design requirement for cooperation that has stimulated the use of PP within 
these game communities. 
Wikipedia Wikipedia is the best known product of peer production.  Jimmy Wales, founder of Wikipedia, 
developed the "wiki" to harness the power of PP to produce an online, free, self-correcting, and 
dynamic encyclopedia.   The "wiki" has stimulated tremendous growth in the number of peer 
produced projects, large and small.  However, it is important to realize that use of a "wiki" is 
not a sufficient condition for applying peer production. 
Amazon Buying a book from Amazon.com places the purchaser directly inside a peer production 
process to which they are a key contributor.  Amazon has made the process of combining 
project components into a unified intellectual work part of their business model.  The project 
components are the purchase history of Amazon's customers.  By compiling and correlating this 
information Amazon can make customized recommendation for other products that may 
interest an individual.  This not only increases Amazon's sales but also provides a very valuable 
and time saving service to the consumer/peer contributor. 
EBay Where Amazon's use of PP serves to enhance its productivity, EBay's business model is wholly 
a product of PP.  EBay has compiled individual product exchanges that were occurring locally 
between seller and buyer into a worldwide marketplace.  EBay uses a PP process within a PP 
process to give the consumer confidence in its marketplace.  By providing a means to grade 
individual sellers and buyers on each transaction and compiling the individual inputs into an 
overall score for the individual, a prospective consumer gains confidence that her next 
transaction will be fulfilled successfully with minimal risk of loss. 
YouTube YouTube's model follows nearly the same form as Wikipedia; the only difference is the form of 
the content being generated and the presentation of the exchange forum.  Wikipedia uses the 
"wiki" and YouTube uses the searchable database with Website interface to collect, sort, 
display, and share peer produced video clips. 
Second Life Second life is another example that follows the Wikipedia model.  It is a free, online, 3D, 
unbounded world (or metaverse) whose content was created completely by peer producers.  
The founders of Second Life (Linden Labs) simply created the blank slate upon which the 
metaverse was built.   
Digg "Digg is a social news Website made for people to discover and share content from anywhere 
on the Internet. By submitting links and stories, voting and commenting on submitted links and 
stories, stories are voted up and down, respectively called "digging" and "burying".  Many 
stories get submitted every day, but only the most "Dugg" stories appear on the front page. 
Digg's popularity has prompted the creation of other social networking sites with story 
submission and voting systems."1  The Digg Website is simply a collector and compiler of 
peer contributions. 
                                                 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digg, accessed 15 March 2009. 
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NASA Clickworkers Clickworkers was an experiment conducted by NASA researchers (Kanefsky and Barlow, 
1997) to determine if distributed volunteers could accomplish massive data analysis.  The 
project posted raw photos of Mars landscape and requested volunteers characterize the 
topography.  The result of the voluntary submissions was statistically equivalent to the work 
produced by post doctoral research.  The only difference was that the volunteers accomplished 
it in a fraction of the time expected.  Once again, the only work required by NASA workers 
was to establish a forum for the volunteers to contribute and to integrate the contributions into 
an intelligible whole. 
Humangrid Humangrid (Human Powered Data Services) is a Dutch based corporate enterprise that is 
applying the NASA Clickworkers model.2  
Xerox Eureka The Eureka project was a Xerox initiative in the late nineties.  It was conceived to combat a 
falling customer satisfaction rating and the rise in product repair time and cost.  The result of 
the project was a peer production system that was instituted at the repair technician level 
company wide.  Through the use of this PP methodology, Xerox was able to set the standard in 
customer satisfaction within their market sector. 
Table 1.   Notable Peer Produced Projects 
These examples listed in Table 1 outline the characteristics of peer production 




 Quantifiable (by the peer producer) value exchange 
 Method of verification and integration 
Self-selection is a characteristic of the PP process that applies to the peer 
producer.  Self-selection means that the individual peer producer determines when, what, 
and how to contribute.  Top-down orders are not compatible.  Modularity and granularity 
are characteristics of the project which is being pursued.  As an example, Wikipedia is 
modular.  Each topic is a standalone entity that contributes towards the value of 
Wikipedia as a whole.  Granularity refers to the size of the module; size is a measure of 
the amount of effort necessary to complete the task or module.  Ideally, a well conceived 
PP project will be comprised of tasks of varying granularity to permit participation from 
individuals with different amounts of available time.  An inherent value exchange is what 
makes PP an economic model of production and not just a good business practice.  It is 
also what gives the peer producers a reason to contribute.  It is because the individual 
                                                 
2 http://www.humangrid.eu/, accessed 13 November 2008. 
value does not have to be pre-negotiated or guaranteed that makes PP such an effective 
method of production.  Lastly, the method of validation and integration is necessary to 
extract value from the individual peer contributions. 
C. TYPES OF PEER PRODUCTION 
PP can be thought of in terms of three types: Pinpoint, Broad spectrum, and 
Indiscriminant.  They are displayed pictorially in Figure 1.  Pinpoint PP is a project that 
requires a very specific knowledge contribution from one or a few expert contributors.  
Broad Spectrum PP solicits contributions from skilled contributors around a common 
theme and integrates these contributions into an intelligible whole.  This type of PP is the 
most like the definition given previously.  Lastly, Indiscriminate PP requires the highest 
volume of contributions.  These contributions are of a sort that requires very little effort 
and no specific skill, i.e., they have very high granularity. 
 
Figure 1.   Types of PP 
The representation given in Figure 1 will be used throughout this thesis to 
highlight (1) the characteristics of peer production and (2) how PP can be used to 
accomplish various goals. The jagged nature of the pictograph in Figure 1 represents the 
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rapid expansion of PP techniques into new applications that is currently occurring.  Not 
all of these attempts will be successful, but the sum total of them all will provide a good 
idea of the potential of the methodology.  While the distinctions between the PP types are 
not as well defined as presented in this model, the divisions provide concept clarity.  In 
application, individual projects can utilize multiple types.  In general, however, the 
distinction supplied in Figure 1 will prove extremely useful in understanding the broad 
characteristics of PP.  The case-by-case nuances need to be determined in application 
only and will only serve to cloud the discussion in a theoretical presentation. 
 
Figure 2.   PP Participation Model 
Figure 2 depicts the major differences between the three types of PP.  These 
differences are the relative expertise of the contributors and the number of independent 
contributors necessary for a project.  From the figure it can be seen that the types actually 
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make up a continuum where one type blends to the next (The hard line drawn in the 
figure is just for clarity and was placed arbitrarily.  Ideally, orange blends into green, and 
green into blue.)  The y axis in figure 2 refers to the talent level of an individual 
participant of a peer produced project.  The x axis represents the potential number of 
participants available with that skill level.  This should make logical sense because it 
parallels projects needs in the physical world.  Not everyone on a project needs to have or 
should have a PhD.  There is also a need for journeyman, apprentices, and support staff 
as well.  Likewise, any peer produced project is going to have the need for participants 
from all talent levels, but the relative numbers will vary from project to project. 
A little more clarity can be gained by associating an example of PP with each 
type.  Brief descriptions are provided here, but for a more detailed description of three 
important examples of peer production refer to the Real World Examples in Appendix A.   
InnoCentive (http://www.innocentive.com/contact-us.php) is a Web-based tool 
for soliciting peer producers for specific scientific and engineering projects.  An 
assessment of InnoCentive online reveals very specific problems that are in need of 
solutions.  The owner of a problem does not care who provides its solution, the only 
concern is that a solution is found.  To achieve a solution, in most cases just one peer is 
necessary. That peer will need either a relatively high level of expertise in a particular 
field or an understanding of a solution to an analogous problem that has been solved in 
another field.  InnoCentive is an example of Pinpoint PP. 
Wikipedia is an example of Broad Spectrum PP.  It uses a relatively large number 
of semi-skilled individuals to generate its content.   
Clickworkers was a project sponsored by NASA which started in Novovember 
1997.  Clickworkers exemplifies perfectly an application for Indiscriminant PP.  The goal 
of the project was to evaluate images of the surface of Mars and identify craters.  To 
accomplish this, the images were made available on the Web to individuals who were 
asked to scan the imagery and mark the craters with a series of mouse clicks.  The project 
was highly successful in both the speed and accuracy with which the task was 
 
accomplished.  These examples identify the breadth of projects for which PP is 
applicable, given the willingness of the project managers to give up a certain amount of 
control. 
D. CLASSES OF PEER PRODUCTION 
Another useful way to characterize PP is by classes.  We can distinguish three 
classes worth noting: internal, outside-in, and inside-out.  The differentiating feature 
between the classes is the relationship between the peer community that is generating 
knowledge content and the sponsoring organization of the PP project.  Figures 3, 4, & 5 
represent these classes pictorially.  
 
Figure 3.   Internal Peer Production 
With internal PP, the peer community is a subset within the larger parent organization.  
The contributions made by the peer community are compiled to directly benefit the larger 
organization. 
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 Figure 4.   Outside-In PP 
Outside-In PP uses an external peer community to make contributions that are compiled 
to benefit the larger organization.  The NASA Clickworkers project is an example of this 
class of PP. 
 
Figure 5.   Inside-Out Peer Production 
Inside-Out PP utilizes a peer community that is external to the parent organization.  The 
parent organization compiles the contributions into a product that will benefit a larger 




E. OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 
From an academic perspective, peer production represents a significantly more 
substantial development than the other public movements that have found traction in the 
Navy.  Total Quality Management (TQM), LEAN, "Just in time" (JIT) inventory 
management, and Learning Organizations are all good business practices that have 
infiltrated Navy processes and structure with the hope of increasing productivity.  
Recognizing PP as the third model of economic production is much bigger than these 
"good practices".  Calling PP the third economic model of production is comparable to 
saying, with respect to Nuclear Engineering, that there is now a third way to release 
nuclear energy.  (Fission and fusion are the other two.)  PP is much more than a good 
idea; it is a revolution in the field of economics. 
1. What Makes PP Possible 
There are two characteristics of modern society that have caused the development 
of PP into a model of economic production.  They are: 
 Transition into a networked information economy. 
 Ubiquitous personal computing power. 
It seems that economic production in the U.S. shifts more and more to either a service 
based or a knowledge based product.  America produces a dearth of durable goods.  It is 
this shift towards knowledge that is the basis of the networked information economy. 
Individuals with home access to the Internet are capable of contributing to the 
networked information economy.  There is no longer a need for large corporate overhead 
to provide the means for production.  Consequently, peer production has developed as a 
means to produce knowledge goods efficiently outside traditional firms or corporations. 
2. Why Individuals Contribute. 
The premise behind why individuals contribute to PP projects is rooted in human 
psychology.  It is best summarized by the Reward Equation. 
R = M + H + SP (Benkler, 2002) where 
 R = reward 
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 M = monetary compensation 
 H = hedonistic value 
 SP = social-psychological motivations 
The reward equation attempts to explain why people choose to do the things they do.  
The reward equation maintains that individual human actions are performed to achieve 
some reward that is a combination of three components.  In general, PP works any time 
monetary compensation is not the primary motivating characteristic (Benkler, 2002). 
It is important to note that the reward equation is not a universal equation that can 
be directly applied like the Pythagorean Theorem.  It is a subjective equation that must be 
applied by each individual or applied across groups of individuals with similar 
motivations to attempt to predict how they will behave.  To be useful, a unit conversion 
must take place, because as written, monetary compensation is measured in dollars and 
hedonistic value, and social-psychological motivations are unitless.  This is typically 
accomplished by translating monetary compensation into a unitless quantity that 
measures personal worth to the individual.  This is similar to the process of conducting a 
tradeoff analysis during system design to ascertain the most important characteristics of 
the system to the customer.  In this case, monetary compensation is converted to personal 
value.  For example, a yearly salary of $100K may be worth a three on a scale of 1–10 in 
terms of personal value but a salary of $500K is a ten.  Of course the $500K position may 
also have a -20 value in terms of social-psychological motivations because it involves 
moving to Iraq without one's family for a year.  However, it should be clear how the 
reward equation can be used as an indicator of contributor likelihood to participate in PP. 
3. How Individuals Decide What to Do. 
Peer production is developed around the central premise of self-selection.  
Because monetary compensation is no longer the primary motivating factor; there is no 
longer a "boss" to give direction.  Self-selection requires the individual to decide what to 
do on her own.  Understanding how a person makes this decision is essential to effective 
application of PP methodologies. 
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To decide between competing alternatives a comparison must be made.  It is 
theorized that this comparison is based on a value to cost ratio (V/C).  Value (V) is a 
function of the reward, R, from the reward equation.  Cost, C, is a function of the money, 
time, and resources an individual must invest to perform a particular action. Any action 
that has a V/C > 1 is an action that is worth doing.  To decide exactly what action to take 
an individual must compare all competing V/C ratios and simply pick the largest.  Of 
course, individuals do not actually calculate V/C ratios but this model is an effective 
means of understanding the mental process of deciding.  It also explains why individuals 
would contribute to a PP project for free, over getting paid for their services elsewhere. 
F. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PEER PRODUCTION 
At the highest level, peer production is the economic model of production that has 
resulted from a globally connected information environment.  It operates in the area 
between market and firm dynamics that did not exist before the Internet.  The principles 
behind PP permit coordination between individuals that could not be orchestrated by the 
other economic production methods.  The organization hierarchy required by firm 
dynamics could prove difficult to accommodate the degree of geographical dispersion 
that is seen in peer communities.  Market dynamics could not effectively determine a 
price structure among peer production's participants.  The number and size of 
contributions, is too varied to be negotiated individually.  Peer production is uniquely 
suited to function in a completely distributed fashion.  As a result, PP's use will continue 
to grow as the marketplace proceeds into Web 2.0, develops into Web 3.0 and eventually 
results in a seamless integration between the real and virtual. 
The economic significance of PP is lost in each individual application of the 
methodology.  At the application level, PP is simply a process.  It is similar to Henry 
Ford's use of the assembly line.  The assembly line was a way to restructure how labor 
was applied to the task of building an automobile.  By more efficiently using labor 
resources Ford Motor Company was able to undersell its competitors and capture a lion's 
share of the market with its Model T.  Likewise, PP is a technique to effectively use 
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knowledge resources in a way that not only changes the landscape of existing markets but 
also permits the development of entirely new markets. 
If the theory is correct, and PP truly is the third model of economic production 
alongside market and firm dynamics, then the Navy cannot avoid understanding and 
utilizing PP methodologies.  The last 20 years has seen a proliferation of outsourcing 
within the DoD.  Peer Production represents the means to "buy-back" some of our core 
processes while simultaneously reducing cost and increasing quality.  To fully understand 
PP, this research approaches the topic from multiple angles which include economics, 
psychology, systems engineering, and philosophy.  This approach produces an 
understanding of PP at the macro and micro level.  The result is an evaluation of what it 
takes to implement PP methodologies.  With the framework in place, a systems approach 
to PP is taken and an implementation strategy is presented.  Finally, this research 
concludes with a discussion about what PP means to the DoD and where we should go 
from here. 
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III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. THE BIRTH OF THE TERM "PEER PRODUCTION" 
Peer production techniques predated the term.  Modern PP began with the 
computer network, USENET, in the late 1970's.  Yochai Benkler coined the term 
"commons based peer production" in 2002 in an article in The Yale Law Journal titled 
"Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm".  Coase refers to Robert Coase 
who, in 1930, postulated transaction cost economics in The Nature of the Firm and the 
Penguin refers to the mascot of the Linux kernel development community (Benkler, 
2002, p. 369).  It is important to note that the first reference to PP is in a discussion of 
economic theory.  It is also important to note that this first mention of the term occurred 
more than 20 years after the computer networked techniques first surfaced. 
In Coase's Penguin, Benkler does not explicitly define "commons based peer 
production" (CBPP) but instead talks about it as a production methodology.  He 
compares this methodology to markets and firms. Firms have relied on internal markets 
organized into formal and informal networks to take advantage of shared purpose and 
collaboration. It is through this development that CBPP is defined.  In 2005, Aaron 
Krowne posited a succinct definition of CBPP in Free Software Magazine.  He states that 
"commons based peer production refers to any coordinated, (chiefly) Internet-based effort 
whereby volunteers contribute project components, and there exists some process to 
combine them to produce a unified intellectual work." (Krowne, 2005, p. 6)  While this 
definition captures a complex concept so that it is easily understandable in colloquial 
language, it does not explain the usefulness of CBPP or what is necessary to effectively 
apply PP to produce a desired result.  For this, Benkler's approach is necessary. 
B. THE BIRTH OF PEER PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES 
A brief historical perspective is presented here to demonstrate that PP is nothing 
new.  To begin this discussion, consider an adaptation of Krowne's definition to define a 
more general term, Peer Production (as opposed to commons based peer production).  
Peer production is any coordinated effort whereby volunteers contribute project 
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components, and there exists some process to combine them to produce a unified 
intellectual work.  By removing the caveat for "Internet-based" we can now look at PP 
with a historical eye and see if any significant examples are prominent. 
Consider the fairly well known document called the United States Constitution.  
Given the broader definition of PP, it is apparent that this document is a product of it.  
Although James Madison is often referred to as the "Father of the Constitution", the 
document was actually a compilation of documents and ideas.  It is based on the plan of 
Charles Pinckney, the Virginia Plan by Edmund Randolph, the New Jersey Plan by 
William Paterson, the Hamilton Plan by Alexander Hamilton, and the Connecticut 
Compromise by Roger Sherman.  None of these plans are identifiable explicitly in the 
Constitution; rather they were uniquely blended by the 55 delegates of the Constitutional 
Convention.3  The final compilation of ideas was so unique and profound that it 
prompted Benjamin Franklin to exclaim:  
There are several parts of this Constitution which I do not at present 
approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them. ... I doubt to 
whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better 
Constitution. ... It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system 
approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our 
enemies...4 
Other than the technology applied, there is no difference between the PP used in 1787 
and that used today. 
Of course, the technology difference between historical and modern PP is 
significant.  It is because PP is now executed via the Internet that many of the objections 
of PP are voiced.  Questions of trust and security are the most prominent of these.  Both 
trust and security were present when PP was used to produce the Constitution.  Although 
all of the participants in the Constitutional Convention were volunteers they brought with 
them a level of trust because they were selected to represent their respective colony.  
Because they attended the convention in person there was also a sense of security.  This 
 
3 http://www.usconstitution.net/franklin.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philadelphia_Convention, 22 
September 2008. 
4 http://www.usconstitution.net/franklin.html, 22 September 2008. 
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trust in the individuals and security of the forum did not translate into trust in the 
Constitution.  As Ben Franklin's words above suggest, the worth of the document 
produced was based on the ideas it contained and not the prominence of the individuals 
who contributed them.  This embodiment of worth is important because PP critics often 
discount the value of peer produced products because they do not trust the individual 
contributors that made the product possible. 
By considering the prominent PP projects of the last 25 years it is shown that the 
result of these processes are valid, trustworthy solutions to the problems they were 
designed to solve.  By considering the engineering behind these PP systems it is shown 
how trust of the process replaces trust of the individual.  It is also shown that security has 
not changed and that it is a related, but separate issue.  Security is necessary to ensure 
sensitive information is not released unknowingly or prematurely.  Sometimes PP will 
meet security requirements, sometimes it will not.  This does not invalidate PP; rather it 
limits the application of PP. 
C. MODERN PEER PRODUCTION TIMELINE 
Today's PP projects follow much of the same format as described by the historical 
perspective above.  They start with a baseline usually provided by one or a few 
individuals, and then through a common interest, contributors voluntarily devote time and 
effort to improve the project.  This process continues until the project eventually takes on 
a life of its own.  This is true for the Constitution, which now has 27 Amendments, and 
for the examples that follow. 
 Figure 6.   Successful PP Projects Since the Advent of USENET 
Figure 6 lists a few noteworthy examples of PP that have occurred since 1979.  
Figure 6 represents the examples of PP that are both overwhelmingly successful and 
representative of the application of PP for an innovative purpose.  This can be better 
understood by considering Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   Timeline of Significant Application of PP 
The foundation for modern (Internet-based) PP was laid in the 1960s, when the 
sharing of computer code among programmers in academia and industry was 
commonplace.  In 1979, the sharing of code picked up tremendous momentum with the 
advent of USENET, a computer network to link the UNIX programming community 
together (Lerner & Tirole, 2000, p. 201). Today, the most well known CBPP project is 
GNU/Linux.  The GNU Project was started by Richard Stallman in 1984 to create a 
"complete Unix-compatible software system"5 comprised entirely of free software.  In 
1985, Stallman created the Free Software Foundation and in 1989, wrote the GNU 
General Public License (GNU GPL) to facilitate the development of the GNU Project.  
The GNU GPL paved the road for the Open Source Software movement, which still 
thrives today.  The GNU GPL is also the legal foundation upon which CBPP projects 
depend.6 
                                                 
5 http://www.gnu.org/gnu/initial-announcement.html, 22 September 2008. 
6 http://www.usconstitution.net/franklin.html, 22 September 2008. 
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Richard Stallman laid the foundation for CBPP but it was Linus Torvalds, in 
1991, which started the revolution.  It began with a simple USENET posting to a 
newsgroup. 
Hello everybody out there using minix —  I'm doing a (free) operating 
system (just a hobby, won't be big and professional like gnu) for 386(486) 
AT clones. This has been brewing since April, and is starting to get ready. 
I'd like any feedback on things people like/dislike in minix, as my OS 
resembles it somewhat (same physical layout of the file-system (due to 
practical reasons) among other things). 
  I've currently ported bash(1.08) and gcc(1.40), and things seem to work. 
This implies that I'll get something practical within a few months, and I'd 
like to know what features most people would want. Any suggestions are 
welcome, but I won't promise I'll implement them :-) 
  Linus (torvalds@kruuna.helsinki.fi) 
  PS. Yes – it's free of any minix code, and it has a multi-threaded fs. It is 
NOT portable (uses 386 task switching etc), and it probably never will 
support anything other than AT-harddisks, as that's all I have :-(. 
– Linus Torvalds7 
With this first notice of the existence of what would eventually be known as Linux, the 
stage was already set for mass collaboration.  Torvalds knew he could not engineer a 
complete solution without outside input.  Linux was first released under its own license 
but in December 1992, Torvalds released version 0.99 under the GNU GPL.  Presently, 
the community does most of the work on GNU/Linux development.  Programmers that 
use Linux around the world send their input to maintainers who perform the function of 
quality and standards control.8  Corporations, like IBM and HP, have also seen the 
benefit of Open Source Software (OSS) and frequently contribute both money and work 
force to its development.  This process provides an excellent example how traditional 
models of production can be blended with the PP methodology with benefits for all 
involved.9 
                                                 
7 http://www.linux.org/info/linus.html, accessed 22 September 2008. 
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Linux, accessed 22 September 2008. 
9 The birth of modern peer production essentially occurred when human collaboration was combined 
with P2P networks. 
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The combination of the Linux kernel and GNU software has led to the 
restructuring of major corporations, the revision of well-established economic theory and 
the formation of an entire sub-culture based on OSS development.  This last event is so 
significant that in September 2000, the President's Information Technology Advisory 
Committee wrote 
The open source development model represents a viable strategy for 
producing high quality software through a mixture of public, private, and 
academic partnerships.  This open source approach permits new software 
to be openly shared, possibly under certain conditions determined by a 
licensing agreement, and allows users to modify, study, or augment the 
software's functionality, and then redistribute the modified software under 
similar licensing restrictions.  By its very nature, this approach offers 
government the additional promise of leveraging its software research 
investments with expertise in academia and the private sector.10 
Cooperative software development was a natural evolution once computer 
programmers became networked through computer systems.  Ultimately, a computer 
programmer's objective is to get working code.  The software firm's objective, however, 
is to generate revenue by introducing a functioning application to market.  Cooperative 
software development is compatible with computer programmers; rather it is 
incompatible with the firm's proprietary nature and need to generate return on investment. 
If it was not for the OSS movement (and peer production), it is safe to say that the 
growth of the Internet would not have been nearly as rapid in its formative years.  In 
1995, the Apache Web server went open source.  Since 1996 it has been the most popular 
server on the World Wide Web.  To this day, Apache runs more than 46% of all Websites 
and over 66% of the Web's most highly trafficked.11  It is this free, community-
developed, software that permitted millions of Websites to be introduced and reliably 
accessed practically over-night. 
 
 
10 Letter to the President from the PITAC dated 11 September 2000, 
http://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/pitac/pres-oss-11sep00.pdf, accessed 22 September 2008. 
11 Apache HTTP Server. (2009, April 3). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 22:47, 3 
April 2009, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Apache_HTTP_Server&oldid=321408899. 
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In 1996, the first significant use of PP techniques outside of software 
development was implemented.  Xerox, with its customer satisfaction rating plummeting 
within its copy machine market, was in desperate need of a new organizational model to 
help its field technicians effectively maintain their customer's machines.  Xerox found its 
solution in a peer production process that they implemented worldwide.  See Appendix A 
for more detail on this project. 
In 1997, the dot com boom was rapidly gaining momentum.  It was during this 
year that PP techniques reached out into many new markets.  Three noteworthy PP 
endeavors started at this time.  They now represent the first of many applications that use 
PP in each of their respective genres.  Slashdot started the peer produced news media 
frenzy.  This movement developed into the blogosphere and eventually forced the major 
news networks to adopt PP techniques just to maintain relevancy.  EBay, a peer produced 
retail enterprise, provides sole-source and supplemental income to hundreds of thousands 
of individuals in the United States and world-wide.  It is the small business's doorway to 
a global marketplace. It could not be possible without PP.  OpenOffice also arrived on the 
scene in 1997 as the only alternative to proprietary word processing software. 
1998–2000 saw further expansion of PP techniques into new markets.  Netscape 
Navigator was the open source alternative for Web browsers in 1998.  In 1999, Napster 
used PP to turn the music industry upside down.  Napster was  
…a centralized service that greatly simplifies and expands the ability of 
Internet users to copy MP3 music files from other persons' computers. It 
does so by providing a "virtual meeting place" where an individual user of 
the Napster system can find MP3 music files on the hard drive of other 
computers participating, at that moment, in the Napster "community." 
Napster then facilities the direct "peer-to-peer" copying and transfer of 
those files (U.S. Court of Appeals, 2001). 
Napster was eventually shut down, but not before costing millions in legal fees and 




Wikipedia changed the encyclopedia business in 2000.  Today, Wikipedia still 
receives a significant amount of criticism, but it is interesting that the majority of the 
criticism comes from those that are most threatened by its existence, namely academia. 
The users of knowledge rather than the creators of it (academia) are much more 
comfortable with Wikipedia. 
Second Life is a virtual 3-D environment fielded in 2003.  It has become a 
premier example of peer production since then.  The founding company, Linden Labs, 
designed the virtual environments software and operates and maintains the servers.  All 
of the virtual content is a result of peer contributions, however.  This virtual environment 
has been so successful that it now has over 15 million accounts worldwide with its own 
functioning economy.  There are over 25 different virtual environments available for 
membership on the Internet but in terms of membership, none are as successful as the 
Second Life.  None of the other virtual environments use and encourage peer production 
to the extent of Second Life. 
In 2007, Apple introduced the iPhone into the cell phone market.  This was 
unique because with the phone, Apple and AT&T introduced a new business model.  
With the iPhone, AT&T provides the service coverage, and Apple maintains the software 
support.  This new model has permitted Apple to open up the support software market to 
a PP process.  Apple has been able to provide faster software updates and an 
unprecedented selection of support and accessory application software. 
The unthinkable occurred in 2008.  Microsoft, a company that invests billions in 
R&D and property rights protection, realized that they could no longer keep up with the 
pace of peer production.  Microsoft unleashed two PP models.  The first is devoted to 
development of its Web browsing software, Internet Explorer.  The other project is 
dedicated to redefining Microsoft's corporate image into a fun, user friendly and hip 
institution.  Whether either of these attempts will be successful has yet to be determined, 
but it says a lot when one of the largest corporate institutions recognizes they cannot 
secure a successful future using the traditional techniques alone. 
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Since the start of the GNU project, the OSS development model has expanded and 
now applies to anything that is considered non-rival; namel,y all instances of knowledge, 
information, and culture.  PP encompasses this broader application and represents a 
viable strategy for engineering high quality solutions through a mixture of public, private 
and academic partnerships.  Two conclusions can be made from the chronological 
depiction of PP.  The first is that PP techniques have undergone a long development 
process which has demonstrated the applicability of these techniques in many different 
application areas.  The second is that the success of the above listed projects makes PP 
worth both the risk and cultural change necessary to implement them. 
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IV. ECONOMICS OF PEER PRODUCTION 
If I give you a pfennig, you will be one pfennig richer and I'll be one 
pfennig poorer. But, if I give you an idea, you will have a new idea, but I 
shall still have it, too. 
         Albert Einstein 
Existing work with peer production falls into two categories: applying PP 
techniques, or economic analysis of the outcomes that have been produced with PP 
methods.  The most important conclusion of these economic studies is that PP is 
compatible with and enhances a free market economy.12  The PP model is applicable in 
the public, private, and academic worlds. PP will make these enterprises more efficient 
when applied appropriately.  The corollary, however, is that PP does not improve all 
applications.  Consequently, PP cannot replace all other production methodologies of the 
free market, but rather augments them.  Thus far, PP has been successfully utilized in the 
realm of information, knowledge, and culture generation (Benkler, 2006).  However, the 
boundaries of PP are yet to be fully determined.  For now, the existence of limitations 
seems a plausible hypothesis. 
A. ECONOMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
Consider what has been accomplished to date with PP.   
 The Open Source software community and its work continually increase. 
 The English version of Wikipedia contains 2,365,688 articles as of May 
2008 and there are more than 100,000 articles in each of 18 other 
languages. 
 Second Life is an online, 3D, virtual world, whose content is completely 
created by users.  There are over 15 million accounts worldwide. 
 In October 2006, Google acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion in Google 
stock.  Not bad for a Website that just hosts other people's videos.  As of 
April 2008, there were 83.4 million videos on YouTube. 
 
12 The studies include those by Benkler (2002), Lerner and Tirole (2005), Bobrow and Whalen (2002), 
Lerner, Pathak and Tirole (2006), Johnson (2001), Tapscott and Williams (2006). 
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 EBay uses PP to build user confidence through the rating of buyers and 
sellers.  EBay then draws revenue from the combined effect of millions of 
individual sales between millions of buyers and thousands of sellers. 
B. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
Peer production is usually studied from an economic perspective.  In the industrial 
age, it was often more efficient for an organization to subsume a function or vertically 
integrate it to fulfill a need (Haque, 2005).  Historically, if a company was in the business 
of making cars, it would also assume the task of designing and making engines because 
(1) the management costs of doing it internally were less than the transaction cost of 
finding an external supplier, and (2) ownership of intellectual property is fundamental to 
control.  Vertical integration was considered "good practice" through the industrial 
information economy, and, in many cases, is still the most efficient means of enterprise 
organization.  However, an increasing number of examples demonstrate that the model 
inadequately addresses business needs for efficiencies in the information age. 
This thesis was a study of the importance and viability of PP methodologies to the 
DoD.  It also highlighted the process repertoire needed to implement PP successfully.  As 
such, it was first necessary to understand what makes PP economically significant as well 
as to understand pre-PP economic theory.  This discussion starts with transaction cost 
economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937).  The author accepts TCE as correct, and takes it as the 
economic baseline from which PP is evaluated.  However, there are competing and 
complementary theories about the nature of the firm—to account for shortcomings in 
TCE.13  Some of these do apply to PP.  Nonetheless, most of the useful questions about 
PP originate from a TCE point of view.  This thesis uses TCE to convey how PP relates 
to the traditional economic theory of production.  This view of PP was then projected to 
its logical end, which suggested the need for refinement of economic theories of firm 
boundaries. Figure 8 summarizes the process. 
 
13 Some of the alternative theories to TCE for the nature of the firm are outlined in the following:  
Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360, 1976., Cyert, Richard and 
March, James. Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Oxford: Blackwell, 1963. 
 
Figure 8.   Incorporating Peer Production into Economic Theory 
TCE, first suggested in 1937 by Ronald Coase, explains the nature of the firm and 
how its organization and operation were not just an extension of market dynamics and the 
differences in price structure.  Coase first questioned existing assumptions and made his 
own observations.  The assumption under question was that market enabled interactions 
(supply and demand) determined resource flow.  This was assumed to be true both inside 
and outside the boundary of the firm.  Coase, however, observed that an employee inside 
a firm does not move from division X to division Y because market prices tell him to do 
so.  He does it because his boss tells him. 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated 
through a series of exchange transactions in the market. Within a firm, 
these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated 
market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the 
entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production (Coase, 1937, p. 19). 
Coase concluded there were obviously two methods of production — firm and market.  
The question was then, if production could be coordinated entirely through the market, 
why did firms exist at all?  Coase surmised that the reason firms exist, is because there is 
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a cost associated with both discovering the appropriate price and negotiating individual 
contracts for each exchange in the market.  In fact, the firm exists to reduce or eliminate 
these costs.  “A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into 
existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.” (Coase, 
1937, p. 22) 
A firm will internalize a function as long as the management cost of doing so is 
less than the transaction cost of conducting the same function on the market.  Eventually, 
“diminishing returns on management” will be experienced, and the firm will cease 
growing.  Conversely, PP does not depend on direction from a hierarchical entity.  It is a 
network of peers, which comes into existence around a particular purpose, where in most 
cases the only resource necessary is knowledge and the direction of resource flow is self-
selecting. 
With the above understanding of TCE, we consider the current economic 
landscape and how it has paved the way for peer production—making PP economically 
beneficial in some applications.  In addition, this section concludes by suggesting what is 
necessary to seamlessly integrate PP into economic theory.  Note, that Coase has already 
set the stage for this in his original document.   
…it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through 
mistakes will increase with an increase in the spatial distribution of the 
transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the 
probability of changes in the relevant prices.  As more transactions are 
organized by an entrepreneur, it would appear that the transactions would 
tend to be either different in kind or in different places.  This furnishes an 
additional reason why efficiency will tend to decrease as the firm gets 
larger.  Inventions which tend to bring factors of production nearer 
together, by lessening spatial distribution, tend to increase the size of the 
firm.  Changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to reduce 
the cost of organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm.  
All changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the 
size of the firm. (Coase, 1937, p. 25) 
It appears that Coase was mistaken about the effect of future technological innovation.  
Although he correctly observed that inventions such as the telegraph, telephone, VTC, 
and email have made it possible to increase the size of the firm, numerous examples of 
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global corporations like IBM and Proctor and Gamble abound.  The rise of peer 
production represents use of technology to bypass the firm completely. 
C. ECONOMIC SHIFT 
Yochai Benkler, the originator of the term peer production, is largely responsible 
for drawing academic attention to this surprising change in market dynamics.  Like Coase 
before him, he first noticed that the way the free market was being described was not in 
sync with the new ways in which it was beginning to operate.  The traditional firm vs. 
market standard cannot account for PP methods, undirected by either price structure or 
organizing authority.  Benkler explained this by describing a series of economic shifts 
that have occurred since the dawn of the Internet. 
According to Benkler, there has been a shift in economic production methods in 
developed nations.  That shift can be characterized as a transition to an “industrial 
information economy” where “practical individual freedom to cooperate with others in 
making things of value was limited by the extent of the capital requirements of 
production” to a “networked information economy” where “the physical capital required 
for production is broadly distributed throughout society”.  This happens because 
personal computers and network connections are ubiquitous…..The result 
is that a good deal more that human beings value can now be done by 
individuals, who interact with each other socially, as human beings and as 
social beings, rather than as market actors through the price system.  
Sometimes these non-market collaborations can be better at motivating 
effort and can allow creative people to work on information projects more 
efficiently than would traditional market mechanisms and corporations. 
(Benkler, 2006, p. 6) 
Benkler's description seems to be consistent with what is observed in the 
economy from a street level view.  The media industry provides support for the new 
view.  Just 25 years ago, news came from one of four sources: word of mouth, 
newspaper, TV, or radio.  With the exception of word of mouth, behind each of these 
media was a huge, highly structured industrial complex that took little, if any, input from 
outside channels.  Now there is almost a complete reversal of information flow.  
Newspapers are approaching obsolescence.  Radio is evolving towards super-
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specialization in the form of satellite radio or personal customization in the form of 
Internet radio.  The big three networks are still around but they have been joined by over 
a hundred more.  At the individual level, EVERYONE can completely personalize both 
where they get their news and what topics are highlighted.  At the TV network level, 
news broadcast content and entertainment programming is now determined by the 
collective interest of the masses through blogging, online surveys, peer produced 
reporting, and reality TV.  This is essentially "word of mouth" on technological steroids. 
The overarching shift is primarily based on two smaller shifts.  The first is a shift 
to an economy centered on information and cultural production.  This shift actually began 
with the start of the industrial information economy and can be tied closely to 
globalization.  In the United States, as more and more production moved off shore, the 
value generation in this country turned to the production of culture, information, and 
knowledge to compensate.  Now factor in the second shift, the proliferation of 
tremendous personal computing power and the stage is set to bypass the structure that the 
industrial complex established to maximize profit and minimize cost.  Combining these 
shifts has resulted in the rise of large-scale cooperative efforts now termed peer 
production. (Benkler, 2006) 
D. A NEW MODEL OF PRODUCTION 
The idea of PP typically meets much resistance because it is incompatible with 
the traditional measure of business effectiveness, i.e., cost.  Until recently, two models of 
production existed in the United States.  They were markets and firms.  The decision 
between the two is essentially a “make or buy” decision (Franck, 2004).  A major 
determining factor used to differentiate when to use each is cost.14  Operating in markets 
entails incurring associated transaction costs.  These costs can be understood as resulting 
from the “friction” in the market.  This friction is a function of expenditure of time, 
resources and management attention that is required to conduct market transactions 
 
14 The other biggie is intellectual property ownership.  Underpinning a market expansion or 
consolidation is the need to "own" the basis from which you achieve and hold market share.  Ownership is 
a still a factor in deciding to use PP.  Sometimes it means giving up ownership to experiences gains through 
other avenues as in IBM's use of the Linux operating system.  Other times, ownership is maintained as in 
Proctor and Gamble's use of InnoCentive. 
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(Franck, 2004).  Likewise, the “make” decision incurs operation costs.15  If transaction 
cost is less than operation cost then markets may be more attractive.  When the reverse is 
true, firms are more appealing.  PP also subscribes to a cost analysis but it can be thought 
of as a blend of market and firm.  Since PP deals primarily with knowledge, information, 
and culture, which are more broadly termed non-rival goods, there are no lost economies 
of production.  Transaction costs in the market are incurred at the beginning of the market 
exchange.  Management costs in firm dynamics are seen throughout the process.  PP's 
costs, called integration costs, represent the overhead required to implement the PP 
process.  This inefficiency is a function of the effort required to prepare the project for 
presentation to the peer community and then to assemble the individual peer 
contributions into an intelligible whole. This must be done “in-house” and is essentially a 
project management function.  Often, however, the integration can be transparent (it is 
accomplished as part of completing the task) or it can be automated (as in the NASA 
Clickworker’s case).  It is simply the cost of doing business in this particular model of 
production.  Before PP in an Internet environment, the right choice of production was the 
one with the lowest cost. This is still the case.  The only difference is the presence of a 
third option in PP. 
E. ECONOMIC PLAYERS 
To understand this peer production methodology fully, one must also consider the 
nature of the “peers” in the PP model.  From Webster’s Dictionary, a peer is “a person or 
thing of the same rank, value, quality, ability, etc.”  In the context of peer production, the 
peer refers to the notion of same rank.  There is no hierarchical structure and there is no 
presupposed value based on an individual's position.  This is because with PP the value is 
not placed on the individual who provides the knowledge, but rather the knowledge itself.  
If this was not the case, then procedurally PP would have to vet the participants to assure 
they are peers. 
 
15 These operations costs can be further categorized as a combination of lost economies of production, 
“Agency” costs, and “Influence” costs.  For more information see Business Case Analysis and Contractor 
vs. Organic Support: A First-Principles View, Franck, 2004. 
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Just because the peers are of the same rank it is not to say that there are not 
differences in ability among the peers.  Wikipedia provides a good demonstration of this 
concept.  In Wikipedia, everyone is an equal in that they have the ability to contribute to 
the project equally but not everyone has the expertise to contribute on every subject.  This 
is also not to say that there is not a distinct and definable relationship between the 
customer who desires the system, and the entirety of the peers that are doing the 
constructing.  What this does say is that these relationships within the peer community 
are not hierarchical. 
Peer production’s core concept is the “Prosumer."16  The prosumer is touted as 
the central character in a global revolution of production and value generation.  
Communities of prosumers have created the open source subculture in software 
development.  Prosumers are responsible for the incredible growth, accuracy, and value 
of the “Wikipedia,” which now boasts over 1.9 million articles in English and over eight 
million articles combined in 253 different languages.17,18  Prosumer involvement 
allowed YouTube to create $1.65 billion in wealth, as measured by the value of Google 
stock received for their conglomeration of user created content.  Prosumers have created 
revolutionary results in a number of cases even though the application of PP methods is 
still in its infancy.  Ultimately, it is the prosumer that gives the networked information 
economy is potency.  The prosumer with his personal computer has completely 
transformed the value chain of the industrial information economy. 
 
16 The concept of the “producer-consumer” is not new.  It was first suggested in the 1972 book, Take 
Today, by Marshall McLuhan but was officially coined in The Third Wave (1980) by futurist Alvin Toffler. 
Prosumer. (11 August 2007). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 11 August 2007, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Prosumer&oldid=321940037. 
17 Wikipedia metadata, www.wikipedia.org, accessed 11 August 2007. 
18 There are many, especially in academia, who do not recognize Wikipedia as a reputable source of 
information.  Accuracy is viewed as a function of peer review.  This is the means through which new 
information and theories are tested and are the purpose of the many academic and professional journals that 
are published.  This process takes a tremendous amount of time especially for the most innovative 
discoveries.  For example, the article upon which the economic portion of this thesis is based took over 20 
years to be vetted and accepted by the economics community.  Wikipedia is not meant to be a forum for the 
vetting of new ideas.  Rather, it is an online encyclopedia that responds to the very high rate of knowledge 
generation and in that manner creates awareness of new knowledge, which facilitates a faster vetting 
process.  This is something that traditional encyclopedias could never accomplish. 
F. VALUE CHAINS 
Figure 9 describes the traditional TCE value chain (Coase, 1937) The TCE value 
chain depicts how market and firm dynamics combine to create value for the consumer.  
Each step in the chain adds value at ever increasing cost, which is ultimately assumed by 
the consumer.  The consumer only gets to influence the chain indirectly through demand 
feedback unless a company spends resources directly on market research.  Production 
decisions are inferred most often from data collected on customer purchasing trends.  
Likewise, in most cases, the consumer must choose from the products brought to market.  
Customization is either discouraged through intellectual property rights and patents or 
generally cost prohibitive for the general public.  In peer production, the opposite is true; 
the right to customize and improve is what is protected by law. 
 
Figure 9.   TCE Value Chain 
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Figure 10 shows the PP value chain.  In the PP value chain, feedback is given 
directly to the community generating the product, to which they can immediately 
respond.  This permits a much faster and less expensive innovation cycle.  There is still 
an opportunity for profit generation by the firm, because the consumer community is 
always much larger than the prosumer community.  This is because, by definition, the 
prosumer community is a subset of the consumer community.  An analogy would be the 
number of users of automobile transportation (consumer) versus the number of drivers 
(prosumers).  In broader terms, it is to the non-technical user (consumer community) that 
support and customization services based on the peer produced product can be marketed 
by the firm.  To continue with the analogy, it is the family of five that supports the 
production of the minivans, even though there are often only two drivers involved. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Peer Production Value Chain 
To highlight this shortened innovation cycle; consider two competing products of 
widespread use; Internet Explorer and Firefox.  Internet Explorer (IE) is a proprietary 
Web browser designed by a traditional TCE firm whereas Mozilla Firefox is an open 
source Web browser.  The difference in the innovation cycle can be seen firsthand 
through a Web search for “add-ons” for each of the applications, there are at least five 
times as many "add-ons" for the Firefox browser.  Innovation means two different things 
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for the two product lines.  The innovation plan for IE is to introduce new features as 
necessary to maintain profitability.  Innovation for Firefox is the end goal itself, not 
profitability.  Innovation is accomplished to improve the product as necessary, without 
regard to maintaining profitability.19 
G. IN DEPTH ANALYSIS OF MARKETS, FIRMS AND PEER 
PRODUCTION 
Table 2 lists the important symbols for understanding PP within the guidelines of 
TCE.  It represents an adaptation from that seen in Benkler, 2002.  These symbols will be 




A Individual agent that is available to perform a task as part of a peer produced process. 
e Effort level put forth by agent A to perform required task 
r Resource available to agent to perform task.20   
a An action, this is a combination of effort, e, and the resource, r, upon which the effort is 
exercised. 
tA Talent, t, is A's talent for performing a particular action a.  It takes into account complementary 
and undermining actions by other agents.  It can be represented as a probability that a 
particular agent will be successful at performing an action. 
Oa Expected outcome of action a.  For example, action a could be writing the code for an add-on 
to Mozilla Firefox.  The expected outcome is that agent A will have use of the add-on in 
Firefox. 
                                                 
19 It should also be noted that IE now provides the opportunity for users to create their own add-ons 
for IE8 and share them with others through a PP process.  The “OpenService Accelerators Development 
Guide” can be found at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc289775(VS.85).aspx.  It appears that at 
least one firm has realized it cannot keep up with the pace and cost of innovation on its own. 
20 Resources take on two types, rival and non-rival.  Rival resources are not available to A2 when in 
use by A1.  Non-rival resources can have an unlimited number of agents using them simultaneously.  
Resources can be anything from knowledge of physical laws of the universe (Like the First Law of 
Thermodynamics) which would always be non-rival.  Another resource could be considered a word-
processing capability.  Although this is technically a rival resource, it can be assumed to be non-rival. Any 
agent that would be capable of performing a task in a peer-produced project will have access to word 
processing capability.  Mainframe computing power is a rival resource and is not available simultaneously 
to all agents. 
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Symbol Description 
Va Private Value, this is the value to agent A of action a.  This private value is discounted by the 
probability that Oa will be achieved.21 
P Productivity is the “potential social value” (Benkler, 2002, p. 416) of the efforts of one or more 
agents toward accomplishing the specific project. 
Ct Transaction cost due to market “friction”. 
Table 2.   Important nomenclature to understand PP (Benkler, 2002, p. 406–422) 
1. Creating Value 
The value of agent A's action, VA, can be used to determine if an action, an, is 
worth performing.  A will do an using resources rn and applying effort en as long as its 
value Vn is higher than both doing nothing and doing some alternative action am.  It is 
important to note that this process is not exclusive to the peer production model.  It is 
applicable to all models of production and decision making in general.  What changes are 
the values assigned for each variable in the process.  A comparison of these values will 
show that some actions are both more valuable to the individual and more productive to 
the organization, if performed in a peer produced manner.  Since this comparison can be 
made, it shows that the competition among the methodologies is directed at creating the 
most value for the minimal cost.  The competition should result in equilibrium among the 
available options.  Sometimes PP provides an opportunity to accomplish tasks efficiently 
that is not possible with the other modes of production.  At other times, an action will be 
valuable if performed in any mode of production.  In these cases, the lowest cost 
production mode should be used.  This is a result of how each model achieves 
production.  “Market and firm-based production processes rely on property and contract 
to secure access to bounded sets of agents and resources. In the pursuit of specified 
projects…Peer production relies on making an unbounded set of agents, who can apply 
themselves toward an unbounded set of projects.” (Benkler, 2002, p. 416)  Ultimately, PP 
                                                 
21 Benkler differentiates between private value, Va, and reward, R.  He claims different actions have 
different expected rewards for an individual agent.  These perceived rewards are used to select one action 
from a range of possible actions.  A rational agent will choose based on the value of R.  The author feels 
that this perceived reward is the basis of determining private value.  Private value then becomes R 
discounted by the p(Oa).  Reward will be discussed further in the section on the Psychology of PP. 
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2). 
is just another tool in the tool bag; it just happens to be a specialty tool that is genuinely 
good in certain applications, and simply not appropriate in others. 
2. Being Productive 
The principles of market, firm, or PP dynamics, depending on which model is 
deemed appropriate based on the goals of the project sponsor, have been applied to 
determine a desired course of action.  According to Benkler, productivity then is a 
measurement of one's ability to achieve the desired end. Productivity is a function of the 
resources available, the agent's effort level, and inherent talent to perform the applicable 
task (Benkler, 2002, p. 416).  To maximize production effectiveness, the objective is to 
ensure that the people (or agents in Benkler's terms) assigned to perform the required 
tasks have the necessary skills (or talent, t) to be successful.  With all other things being 
equal, this will provide the greatest productivity, P.  This measure of productivity can be 
used to demonstrate how PP can add efficiency to this process.  Assume the production 
model to be used is the firm construct.  Assume also that it is known which person 
(agent) is the most talented to perform a task (see Figure 11).  A8 is the most talented 
agent overall to use resources r1 and r4 to perform task an.  A8 is a member of Firm 2.  
The most talented person in Firm 1 is A2.  Consequently, if the PA8 - Ct > PA2 then A8 
should be contracted to perform the task.  This is how agents are used when market and 
firm production is the only model.  In a PP space, it is always possible to have the most 
talented person on the task without paying a Ct.  With everything else being equal except 
the boundaries between agents, Benkler maintains PF1 + PF2 < PF1+F2 (See Figures 11 
and 1
 Figure 11.   Applying agents to resources separated in different firms 
 (after Benkler, 2002, p. 418) 
 
Figure 12.   Resources and agents in common space (after Benkler, 2002, p. 418) 
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In reality, everything else is not equal.  The sources of these inequalities will be 
discussed next. 
3. Job Specification 
The question “What should I do?", is answered by a set of very different 
processes in the firm, market and PP models.  In a market, prices are attached to 
alternative courses of action.  From these, a person (agent) can discern how to allocate his 
time.  A firm directs action through a hierarchical structure where the "boss" decides 
what employees should do (Benkler, 2002, p. 372).  In PP, what an agent works on is 
self-determined or self-selected.  The agent evaluates the task with respect to value and 
cost while knowing their own talent level (better than any manager could) and selects the 
best tasks on which to work.  It should make sense that an agent is not going to self-select 
a task with no chance of completing it because the personal value, Va, received will then 
be zero. It is no longer the responsibility of a manager to assign an agent nor does the 
market need to assign a proper price indexing to ensure the most profitable tasks are 
accomplished. 
The key attribute to the process of self-selection is the value to cost ratio, V/C.  
The value, as previously stated, is what an individual hopes to get out of performing a 
certain action.  It is important to realize that this value is not a certainty.  Value is the 
expected payout or reward for performing an action times the probability of receiving 
that reward.  The probability of payout does not have to be equal to 1 for that action to be 
the most profitable choice.  The other part of the V/C ratio is cost.  Cost takes on a very 
different evaluation process for the different types of production methodologies.  For PP, 
cost is evaluated by the individual performing the action.  In most cases, this cost consists 
exclusively of the time it will take to perform a particular task, summarized as an 
opportunity cost.  It is the V/C that permits peer producers to first decide if a task is 
worth performing (V/C > 1) and if they should follow through and perform the task (V/C 
> alternative V/Cs).  This concept will be used more extensively in Chapter V.  
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4. Inefficiencies 
Job specification entails determining what is necessary in terms of time and 
resources to accomplish the necessary tasks.  Job specification must be accomplished 
before the job can be completed.  Because it is impossible to determine what is necessary 
with absolute certainty, inefficiencies in allocating resources and assigning agents are 
introduced into firm and market production.  Some of these inefficiencies are resolved 
with PP.  It is unlikely to know the characteristics of each human, resource, and 
opportunity.  Consequently, it is impossible to obtain perfect specification.  Self-
specification minimizes the effects of this inefficiency.  In PP, the persons performing the 
required task assess their own talents and assign themselves to the jobs for which they are 
best suited.  The process will still not guarantee perfect specification because even though 
the people are aware of their particular talents, the tasks still cannot be specified fully.  
The probability of a bad decision is reduced by removing one variable; and efficiency is 
increased by removing an organizational level from the decision process. 
5. Surplus of Workforce 
The difference between a PP community and a firm or market based organization 
is best exemplified by looking at the boundary of each system as exemplified by Figure 
13.  In a market the system boundary is ill-defined.  Players are independent entities 
interacting based on individual self-interests.  The firm is the other end of the spectrum 
where all associations are defined and there is a distinct wall delineating what resources 
and agents are part of the firm and those that are not.  Inside the boundary of the firm is a 
hierarchy that directs resources.  As demand exceeds capacity, a shortfall of agents and 
resources develops.  Active efforts must be made to expand the boundary of the firm, and 
consequently it grows in size.  The firm will continue to grow in size as long as demand 
supports it. It will also grow in breadth by assuming new functions as long as it is 
economically advantageous.  Eventually, the firm will become too large and difficult to 
manage, efficiency will drop, cost will rise, and the firm will discontinue growth. 
 Figure 13.   Economic Model Boundaries 
In PP, the community will naturally expand as the demand for people to 
accomplish tasks increases.  As more and more consumers find a particular project 
useful, more and more of those consumers will naturally choose to participate as 
prosumers; thereby, increasing the available workforce, and as a result, the net output of 
the project.  This cannot be stressed enough, because it represents a significant advantage 
of PP over the firm model.  A firm requires effort to grow in response to demand, a peer 
community responds organically with demand and grows with it.  This is because a firm 
is structured as a hierarchy; and PP is a network.  This natural growth seen in peer 
communities is due to network externalities, also called network effects.   
Network externality has been defined as a change in benefit, or surplus, 
that an agent derives from a good when the number of other agents 
consuming the same kind of good changes.  As fax machines increase in 
popularity, for example, your fax machine becomes increasingly valuable 
since you will have greater use for it.  This allows, in principle, the value 
received by consumers to be separated into two distinct parts.  One 
component (termed autarky value) is the value generated by the product 
even if there are no other users.  The second component (termed 
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synchronization value) is the additional value derived from being able to 
interact with other users of the product, and it is this later value that is the 
essence of network effects (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1998). 
It is also this later value that is the reason peer produced projects expand naturally with 
demand. 
6. Parallel vs. Serial Task Accomplishment 
In market and firm strategies, resources are always constrained.  There are always 
a finite number of contractors or employees on any project.  Consequently, the rate at 
which a project is completed is limited by the total required work and by the speed at 
which the available resources can accomplish that work.  In PP this is not the case; the 
resources available are only bounded by the perceived importance of the tasks and not by 
some limitation on the organization performing them. 
7. Task Duplication 
In the context of PP, since no cost is associated with a workers time, there is no 
cost overrun associated with a task taking longer than expected.  The only concern is the 
eventual task completion.  As such, it is permissible to allow task duplication.  In markets 
and firm, this is a source of increased cost and inefficiency.  Duplication is not a source 
of inefficiency in PP.  Rather, it is one of PP's advantages as long as the principles of PP 
are upheld.  These principles will be discussed in Chapter VII. 
8. Ownership 
The next question arises because the traditional point of view for evaluating the 
value of certain courses of action is from the industrial information economy, which 
relies largely on proprietary information.  It is “How will the products of these 
collaborative efforts interact with society and the industrial complex?”  So far, “its 
outputs are not treated as exclusive property.  They are instead subject to an increasing 
robust ethic of open sharing, open for all others to build on, extend, and make their 
own.”(Benkler, 2006, p. 7)  In a DoD sponsored PP effort, in most cases, the specific 
output generated will not be subject to open sharing outside of the specific government 
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organization.  The effect generated, increased effectiveness of the military, will be shared 
with the American people.  This will be made clear in the section on the Psychology of 
Peer Production. 
H. ECONOMIC CONCLUSION 
Just as Coase did in 1937, economic theory was used to explain what is seen in 
practice.  This is important because it highlights that these theories are not meant to 
predict something that may develop in the future.  PP is already here; what will change is 
the frequency and scale at which it is being used.  The DoD in general, and the Navy 
specifically, has the opportunity to harness its benefits early or it can attempt to play 
catch up later. 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that PP is another result of the same 
principles that brought about the development of the firm.  It is simply a cost reduction 
process.  PP is only possible because of two principles—self-selection and value 
exchange.  Peer contributors are free to choose where to participate.  When they do 
participate, they exchange value; it just is not necessarily monetary.  Because this value 
exchange exists, PP cannot be contradictory to the ideals that have made enterprises 
economically powerful.  In reality, PP may be the means to keep this country 
economically powerful. 
Further work is necessary in determining the boundaries of PP.  A starting place is 
the reward equation.  The reward equation gets at the heart of human motivation.  It 
seems that technology has lowered the transaction costs of the market so that the 
hedonistic and social-psychological portions of the reward equation can play a more 
significant role.  As a result, it has become much less expensive for those with something 
to add to have their input heard.  The problem is that this applies to both those that are 
motivated to help as well as those motivated to hurt.  The success of PP then depends on 
two things.  Those attempting to help must significantly outnumber the other; and a 
mechanism must be in place to minimize the effect of disruptive contributions while 
maximizing beneficial ones. 
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V. PSYCHOLOGY OF PEER PRODUCTION 
Happiness lies in the joy of achievement and the thrill of creative effort. 
        Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
A. WHY DO PEERS PRODUCE? 
At this point, it should be clear that PP is economically advantageous in some 
applications.  PP is a natural extension of transaction cost economics, resulting from both 
the development of a ubiquitous personal computing power and a transition to a 
networked information economy.  This understanding of PP provides us with a macro 
understanding of PP.  Answering the question, "Why would an individual choose to 
participate in a peer produced project?" will supply a micro understanding.  From these 
two points of view, a model of PP can be systematically construed and applied. 
Just as it was necessary to understand some economic theory before it was 
possible to grasp the economics of PP, it is also essential to describe some basic theory of 
human psychology to appreciate the full impact and potential of PP.  Psychological 
theory maintains that there are two broad categories of human motivation.  These 
categories are termed intrinsic and extrinsic.  Intrinsic rewards are internal to the person 
such as a sense of accomplishment or fulfilling a desire to help.  Extrinsic motivations are 
external and include things such as monetary compensation and praise.22  These concepts 





22 For further discussion of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations please see Benebou, Roland, and Tirole, 
Jean, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, Review of Economic Studies (2003) 70, 489–520. 
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The next psychological theory to consider is Maslow's hierarchy of needs because 
it will begin to address some of the needs that contribute to deciding a person's actions.23  
They include physiological needs; safety needs; needs of love, affection, and belonging; 
needs of esteem; and needs of self actualization.  It is generally accepted that humans 
experience all these needs to different degrees at different times.  The fulfillment of these 
needs can come in various forms.  It is plausible that because humans have these needs 
and are continuously trying to satisfy them, they are drawn to participate in peer 
produced products when no monetary compensation is offered.  This underlying premise 
within PP takes the form of the reward equation, and will become particularly important 
to the stakeholder analysis in Chapter VI. 
With this background of human motivation in mind, consider the study conducted 
by Pearce (1983), which examined “job attitude and motivation differences between 
volunteers and employees from comparable organizations”.  Pearce did not look at 
extrinsic motivations like pay, fringe benefits, and promotion because such benefits were 
not available to the volunteers.  The motivations considered were a mix of both intrinsic 
and extrinsic ones that Pearce divided into three categories:  intrinsic, social, and service 
rewards.  Table 3 summarizes the rewards. 
 
Intrinsic Social Service 
1. Doing tasks that hold my 
interest 
1. Enjoyment of the company of 
my co-workers 
1. The chance to further the 
goals of this organization. 
2. An interesting job 2. Working with people I like 2. A chance to make a real 
contribution. 
3. Enjoyment of just doing the 
work 
3. Associating with a good 
group of people 
3. Identification with the 
mission of the organization. 
Table 3.   Potential rewards to compare volunteer work vs. employment24 
                                                 
23 The author accepts the fact that the hierarchy has received significant criticism.  He also 
understands that proof has yet to be given that the hierarchy exists as Maslow proposed or at all.  There is 
no argument, however, that these different types of needs do exist; the criticism is around their arrangement 
into a hierarchy. 
24 These motivations are very important to all to all of the services.  They are exactly the types of 
things used to recruit volunteers into the military.  Even though monetary rewards are given for military 
service, the money is not typically what makes people put themselves in harm's way. 
 47
Pearce found that  
…volunteers, doing the same work as employees, are more likely to report 
that they work for the rewards of social interaction and service to others, 
that their work is more praiseworthy, and that they are more satisfied and 
less likely to leave their organizations (Pearce, 1983, p. 650). 
These results of Pearce's work speak volumes about the reproducibility and 
reliability of the peer production labor force.  If volunteers are more satisfied and less 
likely to leave an organization but still accomplish the tasks that employees are doing in 
other organizations then turnover, one of the largest sources of inefficiency in firm 
production, has been greatly reduced.  The fact the people routinely leave employment 
for other positions impose a major cost for firms.  Often an argument against peer 
production is that peers cannot be depended on because there is no contractual agreement 
with them.  This claim, however, is shown by Pearce's study to not be true necessarily.  
Volunteers within the right structure can be more reliable than paid employees.  
Understanding what motivates people and designing the project around that will actually 
increase the probability that volunteers will see a task through to completion.  Of course, 
the assumption is that volunteers in brick and mortar organizations that perform tangible 
tasks are motivated by the same factors and experience the same return on investment 
that peer production volunteers do.  Demonstrating that this assumption is correct 
requires further study of peer produced projects.  However, the similarities between the 
two volunteer opportunities are such that significant faith can be applied to the 
acceptance of this assumption. 
Recognizing that humans are motivated by a drive to satisfy a multitude of needs, 
is the basis of understanding why people volunteer.  To say that people are only 
motivated by money, oversimplifies the situation at the risk of eliminating tremendous 
opportunity.  This oversimplification is the foundation of many objections to PP.  It is 
often stated that people will not contribute to PP because they are not getting paid.  It is 
the sum of all the diverse motivations which drive humans to work, to give blood, 
volunteer their time, and at certain times, risk their lives.  It is also these motivations in 
combination with the networked information economy that answers the question “why do 
people participate in PP”. 
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To add a little more clarity to this idea of motivation, it is possible to reexamine it 
from Benkler's economic perspective to ascertain that it remains consistent with what is 
seen in the marketplace and not just in the non-profit organization.  Benkler surmises that 
“at the broadest level, wherever PP can motivate behavior better than markets or firms, 
then certainly it will be superior” (Benkler, 2002, p. 427).  Benkler proposes an equation 
for reward, R. 
R = M + H + SP where 
R = individual agents reward for performing an action 
M = Monetary compensation 
H = Intrinsic rewards 
SP = Social-psychological rewards 
Although Benkler's terminology is slightly different, his concepts are compatible with the 
previously discussed psychological theories.  Now, remembering that private value is 
 Va = p(Oa) * R 
 Va = private value to a individual for performing an action 
 p(Oa) = probability that an assumed outcome of performing a given task 
will be realized. 
 R = individual reward for performing an action 
Therefore, as long as the reward is sufficient to justify performing an action a then 
the agent may choose to participate.  Since R may be positive with zero or even negative 
monetary compensation, it is possible to fully understand why people participate.  Final 
determination of participation then is based on the V/C as compared to alternative V/C 
ratios.   
When comparing a generic propensity for volunteering in traditional ways like a 
soup kitchen or other non-profit organization with volunteering online in a peer 
production project it seems that PP should have a greater V/C ratio.  Given equal value, 
V, for each type of volunteer work PP will have a greater V/C because its cost is lower. It 
may be much easier to sit in the comfort of your home and select when and how to 
participate than it is to find and commute to a brick and mortar establishment to 
volunteer. 
 49
                                                
B. HOW IS PRODUCTION PROMOTED? 
It is worth a little more effort to understand motivation in PP in greater detail 
because it will permit later differentiation between which projects are good candidates for 
PP and which are not.  It will also allow those applicable projects to be structured and 
presented in a manner that maximizes participation.  To accomplish this, research is 
reviewed that has been done in the open source software development (OSSD) 
community.  As previously mentioned, OSSD is the nucleus of modern PP but PP is 
beginning to grow extensively in other applications by applying some of the same 
principles.  These applications include: advertising, consumer product service and repair, 
news media, and consumer product research and development, to name a few. 
In general, it has been found that the OSSD community is very “elitist,” which 
means that although anyone can contribute; there exists an "inner circle" of contributors 
in most projects that contribute a large portion of the key contributions.  By analyzing 25 
million lines of code from 3149 distinct open source projects, found that 72% of the code 
was written by 10% of the contributors (Ghosh & Prakash, 2000).  This does not mean 
that for all PP projects that 20% of the contributors will produce 80% of the work.  The 
Clickworkers study found that 37% of the work was accomplished by one-time only 
contributors to the project (Kanefsky, B., N. G. Barlow and V. C. Gulick, 2001).25  What 
is does say is that there is some work breakdown ratio that needs to be considered in the 
planning process of the project.  The research suggests that the ratio is related to the 
modularity and granularity of the tasks being performed as well as the required volume. 
In the OSSD example, this core group of individuals is both highly motivated and 
sufficiently talented.  It is believed that this characterization will also apply to all 
contributors involved in any "Broad Spectrum PP" where specific talents or knowledge is 
necessary but it is available from a relatively large number of professionals.  Typically, a 
 
25 Clickworkers was a study conducted by NASA researchers Virginia Gulick and Bob Kanefsky in 
the late nineties to see if distributed, anonymous online data analysis could produce results consistent with 
proprietary expert analysis.  When this research began in late 2007 extensive information was available 
through a NASA sponsored Website detailing the scope, implementation and results of the Clickworkers 
experiment.  As late as April 2008 the project was still ongoing and producing relevant data analysis.  
Sometime after April 2008 all record of the project was removed from the NASA sponsored sites.  The 
only thing that remained was a Wikipedia entry and a two page unpublished report by the researchers. 
mailing list soliciting solutions to the most difficult problems serves to both identify these 
core individuals and support the "inner-circle: within the larger peer community.  This 
suggests a few things about the OSSD process.  First, massive collaboration (except in 
Indiscriminate PP) is unnecessary to guarantee the success of a peer produced project; in 
fact, it is probably detrimental to most (Broad Spectrum and Pinpoint PP) projects.26  All 
that is necessary is a small group of core individuals whose individual reward for 
contributing is greater than their cost (mostly in time) of participating.  To achieve this 
core group, wide scale exposure of the project is required.  Mass exposure is the practice 
of unbounded solicitation of contributors.  For example, if computer programmers are 
required, then contact could be made to every university alumni association.  In this 
manner, potential contributors are made aware of the project and the community around 
it.  Self-selection and network externalities will then take over to build the necessary 
capacity from the community.  By continuing this process of mass exposure, self-
selection, and network externalities, a sufficient replacement pool to make up for losses 
in the core group will be sustained. 
Second, the presence of a core group is compatible with the reward theory, 
previously discussed.  Since there is no direct monetary compensation given to OSSD 
contributions from the community, the other components of the reward equation 
dominate.27 
 
As the value of M goes to zero, the value of H and SP increases.  Membership in the core 
group represents a significant increase in SP reward. 
                                                 
26 By examining various OSSD communities and other peer produced projects it is seen that 
successful projects do not have thousands of contributors.  Rather, what is seen is a lower number, in the 
hundreds at most, of contributors that will participate in the community for an extended period thereby 
providing some continuity.  Massive collaboration (an excessive number of participants) cannot be 
sustained by any one project because there are insufficient rewards available and the competition for those 
rewards is too great. 
27 This requirement does not exclude corporations paying some employees to participate in an OSSD 
project because payment is not coming from the community but instead from a third party.  The monetary 
exchange transaction is in essence invisible to the community.  It is also important to note that peer 
producers on corporate salaries are few compared to the OSSD community as a whole. 
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Consider one programmer who must decide to participate in an OSSD project or 
perform another task, such as work for her employer, study for a test, sit on the couch, or 
participate in a fantasy football league.  The specifics of the competing tasks are not 
important except for their associated costs and consequences (i.e., rewards and problems 
caused).  In a simplified model of PP, the costs of participating in OSSD (specifically) 
and PP (generally), are essentially limited to one type, the cost of time.  Since PP seeks 
contributions of a non-rival nature, tangible resources, i.e., raw materials, are not 
consumed.28 
Now, consider some of the specifics that go into the cumulative reward for 
participating.  For application of PP by the Navy, the importance of the social-
psychological contribution to the total reward for participating cannot be understated.  
This is because the social-psychological reward motivations that make people join the 
military are the same ones that will encourage them to participate in PP to support the 
military.  Within this social-psychological reward lie specific intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations.  There is a distinct ego boost and reinforcement of one's belief in one's 
talents, which coincides with being a key contributor in the elite group.  The desire to 
achieve this sentiment is an intrinsic motivation and a reward of contributing.  There is an 
extrinsic motivation that complements the intrinsic and directly relates to an individual's 
belief that participating will further one's career in the long term (Lerner & Tirole, 2002).  
The combinations of these ego and career motivations are, in economic terms, termed 
signal incentives.29  The strength of the signal to participate increases with: 
 The visibility of the task performance to the relevant audience 
 The positive direct correlation between efforts invested and demonstrated 
performance 
 The perceived positive correlation by the relevant audience between an 
individual's performance and their talent (Holmstrom, 1999) 
 
28 There could be a real loss of monetary compensation (the opportunity cost of participating), 
however.  For example, instead of participating in PP, an individual could use that time and get a paper 
route or mow lawns for extra cash.  This is not being neglected; rather, it is accounted for in the value of 
the specific competing task. 
29 It is important to realize that the signal is directed toward the individual and not toward the 
community.  The signal given is "participate".  The strength of that signal greatly affects an individual's 
choice to participate or not. 
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All of these attributes that enhance signal incentives can be designed into a PP system.  
The result is a PP system with a higher retention rate, lower churn, higher levels of 
production, and people who genuinely feel they are simultaneously serving their country 
and themselves. 
Once again, these studies and conclusions were originally made about the OSSD 
community but can be generalized to apply to PP as a whole.  To do this the specific 
application of the theoretical discussion only needs to be adapted to the specific 
characteristic of each project and the community that will support it.  It seems plausible 
that a community of mechanical engineers will measure effort, talent, and cost of 
participation differently than computer programmers.  Consequently, the presentation of 
the specific peer produced project will need to be tailored to maximize the reward 
potential of the applicable community.  For the purposes of a DoD sponsored PP project, 
it will be very important to realize who the primary participants are.  This group will 
ideally be those with the strongest signaling incentives and the most available time (this 
minimizes the cost of devoting that time) but it may also include those with little time but 
view the benefit worth it.  This will be seen in more detail in the stakeholder section of 
Chapter VI. 
There are also temporal effects that need clarification with respect to the reward 
equation.  Lerner and Tirole (2002) describe this effect.  There are both long- and short-
term rewards that factor into the peer's decision to participate.  Any monetary 
compensation can be considered short-term.  Hedonistic rewards, like contributing to 
OSSD to get the benefits of the project for personal use, also tend to be short-term 
rewards.  Social-psychological rewards tend to be more long-term because they take time 
to develop.30  If monetary compensation is a factor, then firm production definitely is an 
advantage over PP.  There are some short term rewards that favor PP, however.  Error 
correction, for example, is traditionally much faster in peer-produced projects, simply 
because more eyes are available to identify and fix the errors.  This is a very strong 
 
30 Some monetary rewards turn out to be long term but they are usually of an unexpected nature.  For 
example, key contributors in Linux software development being awarded stock in companies that owed 
their success to the project.  This is a monetary reward but was unanticipated by the contributors, and as 
such, did not factor into their decision to participate.  
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incentive for the decision by firms and individuals to release a project to an open 
community in the first place.  From the long-term perspective, PP has the advantage 
whenever signaling incentives play a significant role (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). 
What is the differentiating factor if some rewards favor firm production, some 
provide a preference for markets, and others advantage PP?  Non-information products 
are well-suited for market and firm production because information sharing is facilitated 
by the Internet and World Wide Web.  Product sharing potentially involves a higher cost 
of presentation and communication.  However, for knowledge, information, and culture 
products, this is not as clear cut.  A given product, for example, a software operating 
system, could be produced as proprietary intellectual property (e.g., Windows, MAC OS) 
or through open source (e.g., Linux).  The decision comes down to motivation both by 
the originator of the project (those contributing to its development) and by market 
demand.  If financial profit is the primary motive, firm production is the natural choice.  
Fundamentally, people need income to function in society.  Some will voluntarily enter 
into a contractual relationship with a firm or choose to be self-employed and interface 
directly with the market. Through these formal relationships, individuals then permit the 
firm to produce and generate revenue. 
Other individuals, however, either do not need to or cannot participate in such 
relationships.  These individuals (e.g., stay at home parents, unemployed individuals, 
college students, and retired persons) may have motivating factors that favor the non-
monetary portions of the reward equation.  Organizations originating projects may also 
not be interested in turning a profit.  The author maintains that the DoD falls into this 
category.  While there are some projects, due to security concerns, that are inappropriate 
for PP there are also many others that do not have these concerns.  This discussion leads 
us into Chapter V, the Philosophy of Peer Production. 
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VI. PHILOSOPHY OF PEER PRODUCTION 
Innovation is not the product of logical thought, even though the final 
product is tied to a logical structure. 
        Albert Einstein 
 
This research began by challenging one of the most basic assumptions in typical 
systems procurement and development.  That assumption entails the belief that in order to 
maintain control of the design and production process, one must also maintain direct 
supervisory control over the individuals performing the specific task.  This research 
explores an alternative hypothesis: abandoning control can lead directly to increases in 
efficiency and timeliness of the development process, as well as increased relevancy and 
quality of the system being developed or product being produced. 
Why do people volunteer their time and talent to contribute to a peer produced 
project?  Answering this question is essential to being able to structure a project in a way 
that will attract and retain a sufficient number of contributors.  The answer also will be 
incorporated into the system engineering principles of PP.  The best way to grasp this 
answer is to once again consider the fundamental difference between firm production and 
peer production.  People contribute in the firm model because they are directed to 
contribute.  Granted, individuals voluntarily enter into a contractual agreement to perform 
some functions within the construct of a firm.  There are two aspects to this volunteerism.  
First, it stems from necessity, and as such, is not entirely free.  The necessity to provide 
for oneself and one's family dictates that sometimes something must be done.  The 
freedom is just in choosing what that something will be.  Once the choice is made, an 
individual freedom is deferred for security and a paycheck because the individual is now 
contractually bound to perform the tasks directed by another person.  As a result, 




In PP, individual freedom is never sacrificed.  It is important to realize that this is 
a result of individual security being provided by another means.  As soon as the M of the 
reward equation is not the primary motivator, the SP and H assume the role of the 
dominant contributor.  An individual may knowingly sacrifice immediate M reward for 
immediate SP reward, which has the potential of leading to future M reward.  Ultimately, 
the true draw of PP is self-selection. 
A. INCREASING THE SUCCESS PROBABILITY 
Self Selection is the single greatest factor in the success of PP.  The flip side of 
self-selection is control, or rather the apparent lack of it.  However, this distinction is a 
matter of perspective.  In PP, the individual agent has the power of self-selection, which 
seems to imply that the originating entity has forfeited control over the assignment of 
tasks, and in turn, control of the individuals performing them.  From an economic 
perspective, it has already been shown that this apparent lack of control is an advantage 
of PP because it is associated with the decrease in responsibility of having to control 
individuals and tasks.  Consequently, an increase in efficiency and effectiveness are 
experienced.  It also permits a higher probability of task completion as will be shown. 
Unfortunately, the apparent lack of control characteristic of PP is not typically 
viewed as a favorable attribute.  Rather, it is seen as a liability, because without control, 
there appears to be a greater risk of failure.  This perspective is a misconception.  In 
reality, the only thing forfeited is the opportunity for retribution if failure does occur and 
depending on your position in the value chain, this opportunity may not be lost at all.  
Recall from the firm production methodology that the customer's direct interaction in the 
value chain is unidirectional.  She is a receiver of the finished knowledge product and 
only feeds back into the value chain indirectly as shown in Figure 14. 
 Figure 14.   Firm production value chain 
Consequently, the customer never really has any control at all.  All of the control 
rests with the hierarchy in the firm structure.  The customer normally only has retribution 
authority against the firm in the case of negligence or failure.  In the PP value chain, 
shown in Figure 15, the customer has a two-way interaction with the value chain, and 
consequently, much more direct influence on the knowledge product received.  This 
increased influence comes at the expense of the firm's hierarchy (i.e., control).  As a 
result, by properly applying PP, the risk of failure is actually decreased, while at the same 
time customer retribution capability is increased.  This occurs due to four distinct 
attributes of PP: self-selection, alignment of priorities, task duplication, and talent 
availability. 
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 Figure 15.   Peer production value chain 
1. Effects of Self-Selection 
Although it is safe to say that no professional tries to fail, failure still occurs.  
Self-selection makes failure personally attributable.  Consider the firm's hierarchical 
approach to assigning tasks against PP's self-selection.  In the firm construct, customer X 
hires corporation A to produce product X.  Manager A, in firm A, assigns agent A to 
perform the task.  Agent A, for some reason, fails to accomplish the task.  As a result, 
agent A receives a bad review from manager A.  Manager A is ultimately held 
responsible for the failure and is delayed a promotion.  Corporation A explains away the 
failure and describes the corrective action and the extent of the delay to customer X.  The 
true nature of the failure is invisible to customer X, and consequently, the customer really 
has no option but to accept the new conditions, which most likely are associated with 
additional cost.  As a result, it can be seen that customer X really has very little control 
over the success of the project.  All the customer really has is legal repercussions against 
corporation A if they choose to pursue them.  The result of legal action is additional cost 
and delay. 
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Alternatively, customer X decides to complete the project in a PP manner.  Task 
A is now self-selected by agent A.  Although customer X still has no say in who performs 
the task, the probability of success of task A has increased because now the repercussion 
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of failure is directly attributable to the performer of the task.  The performer has accepted 
the task with some reward in mind for successful completion.  Failure to accomplish is 
now not only a failure for the customer but also for the performer.  The rewards that they 
set out to achieve will not be realized.  In the firm example, unless the failure was so 
egregious to warrant dismissal, the agent responsible for the failure really lost nothing 
except the possibility of an undisclosed reward in the future (e.g., a promotion).  The 
agent will still receive their paycheck at the end of the week.  In PP, not only will the 
rewards not be realized but now the failure takes place in a very public forum.  The 
failure is directly attributable to the agent, and as a result, any reward for future 
participation may also be in jeopardy.  Consequently, company X now has more 
protection against failure at no increased cost because the system has built in retribution. 
2. Effects of Alignment of Priorities 
In firm production, agent A is a participant in the process out of necessity.  
Although they may love what they do, they are still doing it for the pay.31  In firm 
production, agent A's loyalty lies with their firm, their hobbies, their children among 
others and at some point, the customer may work into the equation.  There will be times 
in which the firm is not even a top priority for agent A.  Family illness, school concerns, 
moving homes all potentially detract from a person's focus on the task and result in a 
decrease in the probability of successful completion of the task. In PP, this is not the case.  
The agent has chosen to participate in the customer's project from among others because 
they can identify with it (which increases both their H and SP reward components).  They 
also do not have to participate.  So, if life is getting the best of them, they will not 
complicate things by taking on extra responsibilities.  Agents will only select the tasks 
they are willing to complete.  This, in turn, increases the probability of success. 
 
31 It is important to remember that the discussion centers on probabilities.  The author is not trying to 
suggest that these scenarios always exist but rather that they can exist.  If they do materialize then the 
probability of success is decreased.  In that regard, anything that relieves the situation from these potential 
problems will increase the probability of success.   
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3. Effects of Task Duplication and Verification 
In the firm production process, it is a source of inefficiency to have two 
individuals working on the same problem simultaneously.  Sometimes this inefficiency is 
necessary for redundancy or competitive positioning of departments; however, it is still 
an inefficient practice with respect to the specific project being pursued.   Personnel time 
is a very expensive commodity and seemingly it is often the organization that is most 
effective at utilizing personnel effectively that develops a competitive advantage.  In PP, 
task duplication is not a source of inefficiency but rather a natural outcome of self-
selection that adds credibility to the peer produced outcome without increasing costs. 
Since reward is not monetary, there is no increased cost with facilitating 
duplication of effort.  Since the reward sought is H and SP based, the actual reward 
achieved by the individual contributor is not diminished if another proposes the same 
solution.  In fact, the reward is often increased because the likelihood of the contribution 
being incorporated in the final product is increased.  The more duplication experienced, 
the higher the probability of soliciting the correct answer.  In certain applications of PP, 
particularly those involving Indiscriminant PP32, duplication will also lower the 
probability of error.  As seen in the Clickworkers project, it was through task duplication 
that the final product could be given the same credibility as the result created by the 
individual subject matter expert. 
Since the PP community around a particular project is open and non-hierarchical, 
both the problems to be solved and the proposed solutions are potentially viewable by all 
within the community.  As a result, concurrence on a solution is an inexpensive 
proposition.  Once again, this increases the reward of the individual contributor.  It is 
through exposure of a contribution to mass review that both the solution and the 
contributor gain credibility.  The approval of the more experienced contributors is, in 
many cases, the exact reward being sought. 
 
32 Indiscriminant PP was discussed as one of the three types of PP in Chapter II of this thesis. 
4. Effects of Talent Availability 
The best way to understand the effects of talent availability is to recall the 
discussion in the economics of PP (see chapter III, section F).  In the firm model, a 
project manager knows the talent pool available for a particular project.  Specifically, it is 
known how many individual agents are available to work on the project.  The manager 
also knows within some tolerance the respective talents of those agents.  It is from this 
information, along with information about the project that estimates can be made for 
completion time and total cost.  The pool of agents and talents assigned to a project is 
typically constant.  There are barriers to adding additional agents during the course of the 
project.  If additional agents come from within the firm then they must first be made 
available from another source.  If they are brought in from outside the firm then a 
concerted effort must be made to recruit and bring them under contract.  Either of these 
options will necessarily increase the cost of the project. 
 
Figure 16.   Boundary depictions of Firm and PP constructs 
The relative talents of the agents tend to be relatively constant over the course of an 
individual project.  This could cause a greater problem than insufficient agents.  If a 
problem arises which requires a special talent that is not readily available in-house, then a 
premium price will be incurred to solicit that expertise from outside sources.  Pictorially, 
this is represented in Figure 16.  The boundary of the firm is solid and signifies that it is 




Immediately from Figure 16 it is apparent how PP is different.  The boundary to 
the PP community is porous.  As requirements grow within the project, the community 
has the ability to respond to this demand automatically if the community is a vibrant one 
and the project is generally believed to be of significant value.  If the community does not 
spontaneously compensate then growth can be stimulated actively by the project 
sponsors.  Typically this is done by promoting awareness to a larger body of individuals 
and can be accomplished easily and quickly with little expense.  It is also seen in the 
figure that the peer producers are non-descript (i.e., they are not individualized by 
assigning number designations) since they are neither known in number nor talent level.  
What is known is that they are willing to participate to some degree.  This ambiguity is 
acceptable for a few reasons.  First, there is no cost associated with the peers either in 
salary or management responsibility.  Second, because there is no management 
responsibility, there is no need to know individual talents.  All that is important is that the 
individuals assess their talent correctly and choose tasks that are achievable.  Remember 
the peer contributors have significant incentive to assess their talents accurately because 
the reward is only achievable through successful completion of the self-selected task.  
Ultimately then, because the talent pool in a PP project is porous and new talent is always 
arriving, the ability to respond to difficulties is greatly improved.  As a result, the 
probability of successful completion is also improved. 
B. INCREASING THE SPEEED OF INNOVATION 
The complimentary effect of the collective influence of self-selection, alignment 
of priorities, task duplication, and talent availability is a dramatic increase in the speed of 
innovation.  Since there are more agents collectively working towards the same goal with 
greatly varied talent and experience who share a common knowledge of the project, there 
is a much greater probability that one agent will spontaneously spawn an innovation in 
another individual.  As agents can self-select, they can begin work immediately in a new 
direction as soon as the idea occurs.  No approval from a higher authority is necessary.  
This is also where an agent with a potential innovation will experience the greatest gains 
with no risk of failure.  Not only can the agent gain reward for accomplishing a task but 
also for envisioning the opportunity.  In the event the new idea does not come to fruition, 
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nothing is lost except the time invested.  Given that no one was expecting the potential 
innovation, no one will be disappointed when it does not appear.  Typically, however, 
innovation will be the result of collectivism and not individualism.  Innovation actually 
occurs in a series of rapid incremental changes.  Seeing that the project is open, a domino 
effect is possible where one small improvement leads to another and another until the end 
state surpasses what was initially deemed possible.  This is not to say that disruptive 
innovation is not possible, but in this case, the disruption will usually result in the 
development of another community around the offshoot innovation. 
C. CHANGING THE CULTURE 
If PP is economically advantageous, compatible with human motivations, and 
technologically possible, then what is the hurdle to implementation?  Primarily, it is 
culture and the belief that control begets success.  The above description has shown how 
control is not only a fallacy but also its mere pursuit presents a hindrance to success and 
innovation.  Consequently, it is necessary to address culture to pave the path for PP 
implementation. 
The culture that needs to be changed to implement PP centers chiefly on the 
notion of control.  While this is true for any organization trying to implement PP, it is 
especially true for a strictly hierarchical organization like the military where everything is 
eligible for inspection and the tolerance for failure is small.  How to effect culture change 
within an organization must be determined from within the organization itself.  
Understanding why this culture change is necessary for PP is best approached from a 
direction external to PP. 
Ricardo Semler is CEO of the Brazilian Company, SEMCO and author of books 
on alternative business management theory including Maverick and The Seven Day 
Week-End.  The Seven Day Week-End is particularly significant because even though 
Semler never mentions the term PP, the book essentially amounts to a handbook for 
preparing an organization to implement PP.  In the book, Semler describes an alternative 
organization structure based on democracy and not hierarchy, based on freedom and not 
control, based on innovation and not efficiency.  All of these dichotomies are also true 
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about PP.  The difference, however, is that it is difficult to imagine the military 
functioning at all in Semler's construct.  With PP, however, the military can experience 
the benefits of freedom in the workplace without forfeiting command authority.  The key 
to this experience is realizing the difference between leadership and management.  For 
example, the term “micro-leader” does not make any sense but the term “micro-manager” 
is universally understood as “the guy you do not want to work for.”  Leadership directs 
the course of an organization and trusts that the individuals, through prior preparation, 
can work out the details to proceed smartly in the intended direction.  Management 
concerns itself with accounting for time, ensuring procedure is followed, documentation 
and training, scheduling and maintenance.  It is in the area of management that PP is most 
applicable. 
Semler, in describing his control-free management strategy, states it “has led to an 
unprecedented record of innovation, customer satisfaction, growth, and an end to 
repressive command and control management practices that cause much labor unrest and 
personal misery, from the top to the bottom of many organizations.”(Semler, 2003, p. 5)  
He continues by stating there “is the need—the absolute necessity—to give up control in 
order to cope with changes that are transforming the way we live and work.”(Semler, 
2003, p. 5)  The major changes that organizations are currently experiencing primarily 
stem from the transition to the (global) networked information economy.  The speed of 
information flow has made traditional management techniques obsolete overnight.  It is 
no longer possible for the manager to be the most informed, so consequently much of his 
power has been eroded.  The new manager, the manager using PP within a hierarchical 
structure, now becomes a facilitator, one that empowers rather than projects power.  It is 
in this manner that both the individual within the organization and the organization as a 
whole will achieve their respective goals simultaneously.  Semler wrote “Employees 
must be free to question, to analyze, and to investigate; and a company must be flexible 
enough to listen to the answers.  These habits are the key to longevity, growth, and 
profit.”(Semler, 2003, p. 17)  PP does this; it provides an avenue for questions, insight, 
and experimentation that should not be deemed threatening to the command structure.  PP 
can be and must be focused around specific communities within the larger organization.  
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Through the implementation of PP the objective becomes the generation of knowledge 
and not the maintenance of control. 
Specifically, the principles of investigation, questioning and analysis applied 
through PP within a hierarchical organization serve to sustain superior performance by 
always maintaining focus on continual process improvement.  These practices, when 
encouraged as the organizational level, allow an individual to “dip into their reservoirs of 
talent, that pool of inherent interests and skills that is unique to us all.  They dip to make 
themselves feel alive, to provide purpose and identity, to satisfy their egos with the 
trappings of status, to feel that their lives are worth living.”(Semler, 2003, p. 104)  
Individuals will "dip" no matter what.  If the practice is not encouraged within their 
organization then the workers will look elsewhere to fulfill their psyche and needs for 
fulfillment.  If PP is supported by their employers, individuals will not only achieve their 
own objectives, but as importantly, individuals and employers will also achieve the 
companies' objectives. 
Every organization, including the DoD, states it is their people who are its 
greatest asset.  Anything short of encouraging these individuals to utilize every aspect of 
their reservoir of talent fully is a failure to treat people as the greatest asset.  Semler goes 
on to say, “…organizations mistakenly believe that productivity can always be raised.  
Productivity stagnates or falls when workers are waiting for someone to tell them what to 
do, or when they are following a formal plan, or confining themselves to the dictates of 
their job descriptions.”(Semler, 2003, p. 160)  The idea that productivity is tied directly to 
empowering the individual raises a distinction between traditional management and PP 
compatible management.  If management is synonymous with direction, it will eventually 
reduce productivity because the system will only function with direction as an input.  If 
management guides instead of directs then individuals are empowered to proceed without 
specific instructions.  Management then takes on a much wider perspective that permits 
freedom of movement beneath it, inspired self-direction, efficient employment of time, 
and effective use of resources.  This is the definition of management, which is necessary 
to permit a culture that is permissive to PP. 
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VII. THE PEER PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
Imagination is more important than knowledge.  For knowledge is limited, 
whereas, imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, 
giving birth to evolution. 
         Albert Einstein 
 
Thus far, this thesis has been dedicated to describing why PP is both possible and 
beneficial to employ. The task now is to describe how to apply PP in a manner that is 
consistent with the guiding principles previously documented.  In doing so, a generic PP 
system is presented based on a functional perspective.  This system was derived by 
analyzing both successful PP projects and the associated research performed on these 
specific projects.  In this regard, the thesis defines and explores new territory.  No known 
research has yet provided an engineered solution for designing and applying peer 
production systems.  Although beyond the scope of this thesis, a validation of this 
research should be pursued.  It would entail conducting an in depth inspection of less 
successful and failed PP projects.  There are many examples in the OSSD movement 
alone.  These projects can be examined with respect to their adherence to the model 
presented here to determine if the source of their failure can be identified and 
consequently their performance could be improved through a revised approach. 
After describing the functions of applying PP, a stakeholder analysis of a DoD PP 
process is presented.  This is essential for two reasons.  First, the stakeholders are the 
members of the peer community and are therefore the means to applying PP successfully.  
Second, from the stakeholder perspective, DoD PP is slightly different from commercial 
applications of PP in how the reward equation is fulfilled.  This will be made clear in the 
stakeholder analysis. 
Lastly, this section concludes with the presentation of a PP model created in the 
modeling and simulation software, ARENA.  The model serves two purposes.  It presents 
the PP system from a perspective that systematically steps through the application of PP.  
This process provides more insight on how PP operates by juxtaposing the PP model with 
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a firm model applied toward a similar project.  It also is the basis for a simulation of a 
peer production project compared to a similar firm production project.  The results of the 
simulation illustrate and quantify the benefits of PP discussed in previous sections. 
A. PEER PRODUCTION SYSTEM LIFECYCLE 
PP systems are like any other systems with respect to its lifecycle considerations.  
PP systems must be conceived, designed and architected, and setup to promote peer 
contribution, collect submissions, and integrate them into an intelligible whole.  To do 
this, a system engineering approach was adopted that captures the essential 
“technological activities within the system lifecycle process”, as recommended by 
Fabrycky and Blanchard (see Figure 17). 
 Figure 17.   System Lifecycle (From Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2006) 
To gain the most benefit from PP, each PP system must be engineered 
individually in the context of the organizational interests and needs.  Perhaps there is a 
common subset of PP system structure, that while commoditized can still be meaningful 
and effective.  Without amplifying this notion, we assume that every PP system has a 
unique design, because it must be constructed with respect to a unique community of 
peers.  This assumption does not impose a formidable task, however.  PP systems are not 
complex and they do not require any technological innovation.  They only require current 
technology, applied in a PP fashion.  Essentially, all of these systems can be produced 
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with Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) components.  From a hardware perspective PP 
systems are inexpensive, require no customization for DoD applications, and are based on 
technology that has already been tested and applied commercially.  It is low risk 
technologically to implement PP systems. 
Designing a unique PP system is also not as daunting as it seems.  They are all 
uniquely designed, but comprised of similar components, assembled in similar fashion, 
and operating on similar principles.  In this fashion, PP system design becomes 
manageable with respect to cost and schedule.  There is significant duplication from one 
PP system to the next and the portion of new design necessary is limited typically to 
presentation of the specific project and marketing to the desired group of potential peer 
contributors.  Common parts and similar methods make the model presented here 
invaluable because it promotes reuse and identifies the few unique portions of each 
system.  The model illustrates a greatly flattened learning curve for applying PP within 
the DoD. 
B. PEER PRODUCTION DECOMPOSED 
The functional decomposition is the critical first step to on time, on budget 
delivery of a system that meets all expectations.  A complete functional decomposition 
does not guarantee successful system development because many other tasks are also 
necessary.  Without it however the finished system will not fulfill its potential and the 
process to produce it will be wrought with inefficiencies.  The functional decomposition 
presented below serves as the first step for applying PP within the DoD. 
The important thing to remember about a functional decomposition is it is not 
meant to be sequential.  Systems engineers apply process flow diagrams to capture the 
dependency and interaction between functions.  Functions are applied (and should be 
viewed) concurrently rather than sequentially.  At any time during the course of a project 
there could be at least one sub-function from each top level function being performed 
simultaneously. 
 
Three real world examples are presented in Appendix A that examines successful 
public sector applications of PP.  The examples provide a practical understanding of PP.  
They are also written to illustrate how the functional decomposition presented here 
applies to real applications.  All of the functions below are found in these examples. 
1. Top Level Functions 
 
Figure 18.   Peer Production implementation top-level functions 
The top level functions of applying PP, as seen in Figure 18, describe the process 
that begins with identifying the opportunity for PP and ends with the incorporation of the 
product of PP to achieve the desired effect.  The path from beginning to end involves the 
design and implementation of a PP system around a peer community that will self-select 
to participate based on the inherent rewards of the project.  The continued success of the 
system and the collective health of the peer community rely upon the appropriate 
propagation of those rewards.  The following sections describe the specifics for each of 
six top level functions.  These descriptions were decomposed into two lower levels.  The 
complete functional decomposition is shown in Appendix B. 
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2. Preparation of the Peer Production Project 
 
Figure 19.   Determining if PP applies 
PP has been established as a valid model of production.  But, it will not be viewed 
as an option in system development until the system designer accepts the PP model and 
understands the benefits of its use.  Therefore part of the process of preparing a project is 
to determine if it is strategically, economically, or politically advantageous for the parent 
organization to pursue PP development for the applicable components.  This process is 
outlined in Figure 19. 
The process of determining how PP applies begins with an analysis of the needs, 
or alternatively, recognition of the problem that must be solved.  A needs analysis or 
problem definition can be (and usually is) the most difficult part of the design and 
implementation process.  The key is not to proceed into design with a perceived need.  
The result of an effective needs analysis is an explicit need statement that accounts for all 
customers' (stakeholders) true needs.  Often these true needs are not even remotely 
similar to the stated need that initiated the analysis.  The transition from perceived to true 
need is accomplished in part by determining the process to which improvements are 
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necessary and identifying the root objectives.  Once the root objectives are known and an 
awareness of PP exists, an opportunity to use PP may present itself. 
Determining if an opportunity exists for PP is the second sub-function of 
preparing the project.  It is in this step that the principles of PP previously listed in 
section B of this chapter are first applied.  PP simply will not succeed if a community of 
peers to perform the work cannot be identified.  Likewise, if the project cannot be 
distributed to those peers with sufficient granularity and modularity to get the V/C ratio 
for the proposed peer community to greater than one, then PP will also fail.  If a 
community can be identified and the project characteristics are such to permit PP then its 
application is feasible.  However, feasibility does not mean that it is advantageous to do 
so.  Once the peers produce their individual components these parts need to be 
incorporated into an intelligible whole.  In this case, although possible, PP is not the best 
option. 
The next step is to model the proposed PP process.  Modeling gives some 
quantifiable bounds to the scope of the project and serves as a bridge to the next step of 
outlining the application of PP to aid in solving the problem.  Once the model is created it 
can be updated periodically to reflect new and more detailed information. 
The function of outlining the application of PP ensures the spirit and intent of PP 
is not violated.  The need for retaining the essential qualities of PP is absolutely necessary 
as there is no contractual obligation governing the performance of the peer community.  
The single biggest factor contributing to the demise of a successful OSSD project will be 
the corruption of the peer community towards the benefit of a select few.  Outlining the 
PP process needs to focus on describing the project in a non-hierarchical process so that 
once it is introduced to the peer community it will be adopted. 
 
3. Designing the Peer Production System 
 
Figure 20.   Designing the PP system 
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System design (see Figure 20) is the most generic of all of the top level functions 
of implementing PP.  It is largely the same for any system being developed, PP or 
otherwise.  Subsequently, only the sub-functions that are specific to PP systems are 
explained.  In particular, the design of the communication flow and the design of the 
integration subsystem will be emphasized. 
Communication flow is unique because it must be designed to be flat or non-
hierarchical.  Information distribution needs to be somewhat automated to ensure the 
most current information is presented and synchronous to assure all participants have 
access simultaneously (i.e., no preferential treatment).  These practices, besides being 
particularly efficient for flat organizations, promote a healthy peer community. 
The integration function describes how value is extracted from the PP system.  Its 
sub-functions involve tracking both the individual contributions and the peers who 
produce them.  This function provides for the validation of contributions and facilitates 
the distribution of rewards.  The integration subsystem may come in many forms but the 
broadest categories are automatic or manual.  Automatic integration is similar to that 
found in the Clickworkers example.  A computer algorithm compiles the individual 
contributions, weights them to reduce the effect of erroneous inputs, and presents the 
results.  Another automatic option is the use of a "Wiki" like that applied in Wikipedia.  
Here the automatic integration is accomplished through a data structure which indexes 
and promotes compilation via a database.  The database is updated with each peer 
submission while maintaining version control and protecting against the effects of 
erroneous or malevolent submission.  A sub-function of the integration process is to 
prevent corruption of the product through the actions of subversive behaviors.  Of course 
there is a limit to the degree any integration system can prevent or minimize the effect of 
subversion.  The success of the project will depend on the majority of contributions being 
beneficial.  Manual integration is much more costly to perform but may be necessary.  
Sometimes integration can be accomplished by one or a group of super-contributors, as is 
often seen in OSSD.  Other times it is accomplished through peer review.  With a simple 
set of rules, a peer review method is used by EBay to provide confidence in individual 
sellers.  In the design process, it will be readily apparent which type of integration 
subsystem is most appropriate. 
4. Implementation of the peer production system 
 
Figure 21.   PP implementation 
Implementation is another of the functions that is relatively generic as seen in 
Figure 21.  This is because PP systems are by design, technologically simple.  There is 
really no need for extensive engineering as would be the case in computer software or a 
hardware product like an armored vehicle. Consider implementation of a software system 
for example.  It is typically accomplished in phased release of both content and controls.  
As such it would have a much more complex functional decomposition associated with 
the implementation.  The PP system simply does not have the same complexity.  
Consider the development of LINUX as an example.  The operating system has gone 
through much iteration of programming changes, beta version release, debugging, and 
full version release.  The community and communication tools used to develop the 
operating system did not go through the same iterative process.  The PP system is 
analogous to the hierarchical organization.  Just as there is turnover in the hierarchy that 
produces any product between iterations, there will also be changes in the PP community 
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between product versions.  However, there will be no need to redesign the PP system 
every time redesign of the PP product is necessary.  Because of the simplicity of the PP 
system it is something that should be functional after the first design iteration.  Linus 
Torvalds did not design the LINUX Open Source programming community.  He simply 
shared a functional baseline with other likeminded individuals.  It is important to 
remember that the PP system is not the end in itself; rather it is the means to the end.  As 
such it needs to be as simple as possible. 
5. Promoting a Healthy Peer Community 
 
Figure 22.   PP community cultivation 
Where system implementation is generic to all systems, peer community 
cultivation is another function unique to PP processes.  The specific methods employed to 
achieve this function will also be tailored to the characteristic of the particular 
community being promoted.  In some cases, a well defined community will already exist 
and the project just needs to be publicized.  In other cases the community will need to be 
grown from a few well placed seeds.  In these cases, the speed of growth may need to be 
controlled to prevent exceeding the capacity limitations of the PP system.  Sometimes 
community growth will need to be restricted to prevent the size of the community from 
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exceeding the rewards potential of the project.  If the community is permitted to grow too 
large too fast then withering may occur.  Withering is where the community rapidly 
grows and then quickly dissipates to the point where it can no longer sustain the project.  
This is caused by not having sufficient demand for the available peer producers.  Other 
times rapid, unrestricted growth will be more appropriate.  Proper synchronization with 
system implementation will assist in the function of community size regulation.  
Establishing the benefits of contributing represents the primary means of promoting 
longevity in the community.  If the benefits are real, attainable, and documentable then 
they will promote continuous renewal of the community. 
6. Propagation of Rewards 
 
Figure 23.   Rewards propagation 
The function of reward propagation (Figure 23) needs to operate in support of the 
reward equation at all times. 
R = M + H + SP where 
R = individual agents reward for performing an action 
M = Monetary compensation 
H = Hedonistic rewards 
SP = Social-psychological rewards 
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First and foremost it is necessary to track contributions.  This is typically automated as 
part of the submission process.  This documentation process facilitates the SP rewards 
process.  This is particularly well-demonstrated in the OSSD communities.  Lerner and 
Tirole documented that more than 90% of code contributions can be traced back to their 
contributor and that altering this record in any way is the gravest of ethical violations 
within the community (Lerner & Tirole, 2002).  The publicity of contributions is the 
function that promotes the SP rewards; it is also the function that assists in community 
longevity.  Seeing the recognition that other contributors receive will promote future 
contributions from others. 
7. Integration 
 
Figure 24.   Result integration 
If the integration process was considered properly in the project preparation phase 
and then constructed with the appropriate detail in the design phase then the actual 
integration of results should be the easiest part of the whole PP process.  This integration 
process is outlined in Figure 24.  In other methodologies making sense of inputs coming 
in from hundreds and even thousands of sources continuously would be nearly 
impossible.  In PP this is not the case because although the content is unique the format 
of each submission is standardized through the PP system employed.  This can be seen in 
Linux development communities, Wikipedia, Second Life, InnoCentive and Digg to 
name a few.  It is simply the way PP does business.  The contributors abide by the rules 
because it is the only way to get their voice heard.  Simply, no rewards can be generated 
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by a submission that is not accepted into the project.  If one submission is not 
standardized then the transaction cost of integrating that contribution will rise drastically.  
Consequently, the contribution must be discarded regardless of its internal value.  If none 
of the submissions are standardized then the peer production model is no longer viable. 
Because format is standardized, it is easy to execute the rest of the integration 
process.  The results are easily searchable, filterable, verifiable, and distributable.  These 
are all of the things necessary to make the product useful to both the project sponsor and 
the peer community. 
C.  STAKEHOLDER ANAYLSIS 
A complete stakeholder analysis is essential to successful systems engineering 
when applying traditional (firm or market) production methodologies.  This is still the 
case when applying PP methodologies but the result of that analysis will be different for 
the same application.  Typically, the most important stakeholder in firm production of 
product X will be different from the primary stakeholder in a peer produced version of 
the same product.  In a firm produced project it makes sense that the stakeholder with the 
most influence behind his voice is the one that is providing the capital investment for the 
project.  With PP this is not necessarily the case.  Although there is some capital 
investment required to prepare a project for PP and establish and maintain the process 
this investment is not nearly as substantial as that required for a similar project produced 
through the firm or market models.  Consequently, the capital provider should not and 
cannot be involved in a PP process in the same way in which they are involved in other 
models. In PP the collective interest of the peers must hold at least the same weight as 
any other individual stakeholder.  This is simply because no amount of funding is going 
to make a PP process work without a strong peer community.  However, the converse is 
not true.  The coordinated effort of a peer community can and does produce real coherent 
results without large capital investment. 
With respect to the stakeholders in PP two factors must be considered; the 
function of the stakeholders with regards to the development of a PP system and the 
function of the stakeholders in the application of that system.  These two points will first 
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be considered with respect to PP in general.  Then they will be applied in a discussion on 
the specifics of applying PP within the DoD. 
1. Peer Production Stakeholders in General 
Engineering design within the firm production model is not designed historically 
to be receptive to outside input.  It is because outside input is so difficult to incorporate 
into a hierarchical engineering process that makes the stakeholder analysis so important.  
If a very specific and concerted effort is not made before system design and architecture 
occurs to seek out those that have a stake in an individual product then very important 
input will be unavailable until too late.  This forgotten input is then usually first seen 
when the system is employed.  This can only result in two outcomes.  Either the un-
consulted stakeholder must accept an inferior or incomplete product or the system must 
be reworked at additional cost and time. 
Because PP is just another model of economic production it is never the end in 
itself.  This should not seem odd.  Firms are not formed for their own sake either.  They 
are created to produce a product, provide a service, or distribute a good.  Likewise the 
point of PP is not to do PP; it is to generate an effect.  In the development of a PP system, 
there are founding stakeholders.  These stakeholders are those that recognize the effect 
that must be generated or the need that must be filled.  It is their responsibility to conduct 
the search for the other stakeholders, which will be the peer contributors.  This search is 
conducted for an additional objective above that for which the stakeholder analysis is 
normally conducted.  Normally, stakeholders are sought and consulted to discover the 
requirements of the system.  While this is still the case, additional information is 
necessary.  This additional information refers to the needs and requirements of the group 
of stakeholders called peer contributors.  Identifying the correct peer contributors is a 
most critical process in the stakeholder analysis.  The PP system will be designed 
differently for different groups of peer contributors.   
a. Function of Stakeholders in the Development of the PP System 
In developing a PP system, all of the stakeholders should be thought of as 
peers themselves.  In that manner, they are stakeholders of equal weight with different 
functions.  The community of stakeholders then looks like Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25.   Peer community of stakeholders 
The community is composed of anyone who has a stake in the problem or interest in the 
fulfillment of the need.  The affinity groups within the community are differentiated by 
the particulars of that stake.  There are affinity groups for those: 
 concerned with the results created by the system 
 using the system 






Filling the interests of each of the affinity groups in the development of the PP system 
begins by fulfilling the interests of the user (peer contributors) of the PP system.  
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Everything else becomes relative to these interests because on the system is fielded the 
peer community will singlehandedly make or break the systems success.33 
b. Function of Stakeholders in Application of the PP System 
Once the system is enacted, the affinity groups will play a different role.  
The primary focus remains with the user affinity group but the nature of that focus shifts 
from active to reactive.  In the development process, active effort was made to first 
identify the potential peer contributors and then discern their needs to ensure and 
effective PP system is created.  On implementation, the peer contributor affinity group 
takes over the active role and begins fulfilling the need for which the system was created.  
The other stakeholder affinity groups react to the performance of the peer contributors in 
two ways.  They ensure the reward equation is fulfilled continually and the V/C ratio of 
the peer community as a whole remains greater than one.  They also react to the effects 
created by the peer community.  Because of the unconstrained nature of PP, there will be 
both favorable and adverse secondary and tertiary effects of the PP process.  These will 
need to be addressed as appropriate as the community operates.34 
2. DoD Peer Production Stakeholders 
When PP is utilized within the DoD all of the general discussions on stakeholder 
interactions apply so it will not be restated here.  What is necessary to consider is who 
will make up the user (peer contributor) affinity group in government sponsored PP.  Of 
course the peer contributors of any specific application will be comprised of a relatively 
small and well defined group of individuals.  In general, however, the potential 
 
33 This description is an example the release of "control" and the culture change discussed in Section 
IV are necessary to permit PP to be implemented.  The idea of equally weighted stakeholders is in direct 
opposition to how systems engineering is currently conducted.  It implies "no control" by any one 
individual or group of stakeholders.  This is important because the stakeholder with the most importance is 
the peer community.  This group has no direct voice in the stakeholder discussions.  Therefore, the other 
stakeholders must be equally weighted to protect the peer community. 
34 There is an interesting side effect to the stakeholder affinity groups.  Each member of each affinity 
group has an affinity group of its own.  This is one of the reasons why PP is effective.  In the course of 
performing their function with respect to the PP process, each stakeholder interacts with their external 
affinity group and takes information from the PP community and brings new information into it.  This will 
lead to new peers joining the current PP system and the creation of other PP systems for other problems.  In 
essence this is another way of describing the effect of network externalities. 
candidates for contributing to DoD PP are essentially limitless.  In theory it can be 
opened to anyone whose interests lie with the success of the United States military. 
a. Binary Service to Country 
 
Figure 26.   Binary service to country 
By examining how most citizens traditionally interact with respect to the 
support of national interests, a binary picture of national service results, as depicted in 
Figure 26.  Even in a time of limited war, as has been fought by the U.S. since Vietnam, 
very little is asked of the general public than to vote and pay taxes.(This of course breaks 
down in the case of World War where millions are dying.)   Of course, if they disagree 
with the course of national action their voice will be heard but of those who support it 
little if anything is asked.  In the networked information economy this does not have to be 
the case.  There are a significant number of individuals with a favorable V/C ratio, who 
would be willing to contribute to national PP.  This creates a continuum of service. 
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b. Continuum of Service to Country 
 
Figure 27.   Continuum of service 
The continuum of service, depicted by Figure 27, is the natural next step 
to current trends in Navy personnel policy.  These trends include concepts like military 
sabbaticals, telecommuting and aligning reserve components with active duty personnel 
shortfalls.  These policies are directed at affording individuals the freedom of movement 
that is facilitated by the networked information economy (NIE).  These changes are being 
implemented not because they are improve organizational efficiency but because they are 
good for the individuals involved and meet expectations on how a large organization 
should function in the NIE.  PP addresses the same attributes of the NIE from a different 
direction.  It is focused upon using the increased individual freedom of the NIE in a way 
that furthers the program objectives of the DoD while still meeting the expectations of the 
individual service members. 
Specifically, who will participate in DoD PP?  The answer lies in the 
reward equation and an analysis of some V/C ratios.  The OSSD community has shown 
and the PP model simulation has demonstrated that PP projects typically need a certain 
number of super contributors to be successful.  The natural place to turn for these super 
contributors is the military reserve components.  The utilization of reserve individuals in 
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this manner will provide a true force multiplier because the reservist will manage and 
employ a presently unutilized workforce.  When paired with the appropriate PP project, 
reservists bring with them the subject matter expertise to steer the project, the perspective 
of the warfighter, and the ability to interface efficiently with the private sector.  
Reservists also possess a very favorable V/C ratio when employed in this manner.  PP 
does not require travel to a military installation at regular intervals.  It promotes 
utilization of their civilian professional skills and contacts more effectively and it 
provides a real sense of contribution to the national effort.  All of this is accomplished at 
a cost savings to both the individual and the service. 
The remaining contributors will depend on the focus of the project.  
Sometimes they will be primarily active duty members and other times will be made up 
of contributions from the general public.  It has already been stated in Figure 22 that the 
point is not to solicit participation from everyone but rather to provide the opportunity to 
contribute knowing that only those with something to be gained by the reward equation 
and a favorable V/C ratio will contribute. 
It is important to realize that this is a different application of the reward 
equation than originally proposed by Benkler.  Recall the reward equation is: 
R = M + H + SP where 
R = individual agents reward for performing an action 
M = Monetary compensation 
H = Hedonistic rewards 
SP = Social-psychological rewards 
The hedonistic rewards proposed are exemplified by those who contribute to OSSD 
because they themselves what use of the software program that is created.  This is direct 
hedonistic reward, the individual uses their talents to create a reward directly related to 
those talents (software programming to get use of a software application)  In DoD PP, in 
more cases than not, the individual will not get direct use of the project to which they are 
contributing.  Their hedonistic value is created through development of their skills and 
use of the security provided by the military to which they are assisting. 
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Specifically, these individuals with favorable V/C ratios are: 
 Stay at home parents, especially those who were once 
professionals 
 Retirees 
 College students 
 The perpetually under-utilized or under-fulfilled 
All of the above groups have hedonistic rewards associated with utilizing their skills, 
have an interest in national security, are not driven primarily by monetary rewards and 
have surplus time.  Consequently they all have a V/C ratio significantly greater than 1. 
D. INTEGRATION OF DOD HIERARCHY WITH THE PEER 
PRODUCTION MODEL 
Peer production is a methodology that effectively uses intellectual capital and 
human resources in an enterprise to achieve the desired effect.  Most enterprise models 
today are primarily hierarchical. Consequently, they are constrained into bureaucratic 
processes which can involve significant cost that result from both using the processes and 
maintaining the hierarchy.  Many traditional hierarchical firms are finding it very 
beneficial to incorporate PP in their processes.  These include Microsoft, Proctor and 
Gamble and Xerox to name a few.35  The DoD will benefit from PP similarly. 
The DoD functions as a traditional hierarchical organization.  Many of the 
contractors that produce our systems and provide our services are also organized and 
operate in a hierarchical fashion.  Therefore the relationships within and between DoD 
and its contractors can be analyzed with respect to the coordination/transaction costs 
mentioned in Chapter III of this thesis.  To illustrate the DoD contractor relationship(s) 
several system models are presented below (Figure 28). 
 
35The use of PP by Xerox and Proctor and Gamble is discussed in some detail in the examples of 
Appendix A.  Microsoft has just started using PP in the development in Internet Explorer as was mentioned 
earlier in this thesis. 
 Figure 28.   Traditional Organizational Hierarchy for Systems Development (The H Model) 
In traditional system acquisition the relationships involved with creating a 
particular capability can be illustrated by a program manager that serves as a bridge 
between independent, hierarchical organizations (the H model), Figure 28  Both the DoD 
and contractor hierarchies have their own associated internal coordination costs.  
Transaction costs are experienced by the program manager coincident with the operations 
and functionalities between the two hierarchies.  In effect the H model doubles the 
coordination costs over what it would take an individual company to bring a product to 
market.  Both organizations have duplication of efforts for program accounting, 
hierarchical control, task implementation and coordination, and communications. 
For certain applications, the DoD might make use of the PP model in conjunction 
with its own coordination hierarchy, to experience significant improvements in cost, time, 
and quality of its systems. 
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Figure 29.   Peer Production Model Married with DoD Hierarchy (The Fan Model) 
For certain types of applications the Fan model (Figure 29) is quite appropriate.  
Here the PM acts as a facilitator and organizer among the individual peer producers.  All 
of the traditional requirements from Needs Analysis through Operational Test and 
Evaluation (OT&E) and production still apply.  The real (and only) difference is the 
development of the system is accomplished in a PP manner.  For example, this model is 
especially well suited for software development. 
In addition to the above situations, there will also be a small number of cases 
where a pure PP model, outside of the DoD hierarchy can be used. 
 




In these cases, a Project Management Office (PMO) manages the flow of information 
from the DoD organization to the prosumers in the general public.  The Pure PP model 
(Figure 30) can be best used for certain services and development of administrative 
systems that are required for the DoD organization to function.  Examples of these type 
of applications include advertising, web-hosting, R&D, maintenance, knowledge sharing, 
and problem solving. 
E. PEER PRODUCTION VERSUS FIRM PRODUCTION MODEL 
SIMULATION COMPARISON 
A software design scenario was chosen as the example to model to demonstrate 
how both the firm and PP models work.  Software design fits well into the PP process but 
is typically accomplished in a firm construct.  In that regard it made for an easy 
comparison.  Software projects also tend to be both modular and granular.  They fall into 
the category of knowledge, information, and culture (Benkler, 2006).  Also the OSSD 
movement, which began over 15 years ago, represents the beginning of the PP 
movement.  And there is significant data available to baseline the model. 
1. Firm Production Model 
In the hierarchical process of firm production there is typically a program 
manager and an association of workers assigned as subordinates.  This structure is 
repeated for as many levels as necessary to accomplish the task.  The structure used in the 
firm model is seen in Figure 31. 
 
 Figure 31.   Firm model hierarchy used for simulation 
Within one level of the hierarchy, the major role of the manager is task 
assignment.  To accomplish it a manager has to pair an agent with a task from a pool of 
agents and tasks.  The agents have associated with them a respective talent level for 
performing their required tasks.  Likewise, the tasks have a difficulty associated with 
each of them.  The role of the manager is to assess what the talent level and task 
difficulty is and then to pair each agent and task for the most efficient accomplishment.  
It is impossible to determine exactly what these values are for talent and difficulty 
because of incomplete knowledge and specification.  Incomplete specification results 
because the manager cannot know everything about the task to determine exactly how 
difficult it will be to accomplish.  Likewise, the manager does not know everything about 
every agent to include their education, specific likes and dislikes, personal situation, and 
any number of other factors that will affect their performance of every task.  As a result, 
the manager assigns a specific task and difficulty to each entity, but there is actually a 
significant level of variance to this assessment.  In the model, this variation is accounted 
for through a probability distribution around both agent talent and task difficulty 
(Johnson, 2001).  The management personnel also must assess the time it will take the 
agent to perform the task.  There is also a variability distribution associated with required 
task time but it is a function of the paired agent talent and task difficulty levels. 
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Two firm production behavior models were built in ARENA36 to demonstrate the 
effects of variability and incomplete knowledge specification.  The generic process flow 
of these models is seen in Figure 32 and the description of the process flow is in Table 4.  
The first model represents an ideal firm production process.  This model assumes perfect 
specification for agent talent, task difficulty and duration.  Perfect specification means 
that, on a scale of 1–10, if a task is thought to be an eight in difficulty it is actually an 
eight when performed.  The same goes for agent talent, if an agent is assessed by 
management to be a six then the agent always performs to the standards of a six in talent.  
Therefore, the ideal model has no variability associated with it.  Once assigned, talent, 
task difficulty and duration are constant.  There is still variability between the results of 
each simulation replication because of the randomness in assigning the available talent of 
the pool of agents, along with the difficulty and duration of the tasks.  In one replication, 
there may be easier tasks than another or more talented agents than another replication.  
The output of the ideal model simulation presents the best case for accomplishing the 
project with respect to total time taken to accomplish all the tasks.  In order to put the 
output in understandable terms a notional cost is assigned to the project.  This is 
accomplished by assigning a wage rate to each agent based on their position in the model 
hierarchy.  The sum of the wage rates multiplied by the total time taken results in a 
number equivalent to the labor cost of the simulated project. 
The second firm model represents the real case where incomplete specification is 
considered.  The distributions used to assign this variability are described in Table 5.  The 
firm process variables representing talent and difficulty in both firm models were 
assigned discrete integer values between 1 and 10.  These values were used to determine 
whether a particular agent can accomplish a task.  If an agent has a talent equal to or 
greater than task difficulty then that agent was deemed capable of accomplishing the task.  
This process of assigning weighting factors was used to mimic the process of assigning 
personnel to tasks in actual project management.  The scale from 1 to 10 was used 
 
36  ARENA is a software application that facilitates the creation of process models that can be run 
through any number of replications.  The replication process generates statistical data about the process so 
conclusions can be drawn about performance over time.  In this case, I used ARENA to statistically 
compare a firm production process with a peer production process in terms of project time, cost, rework, 
and number of personnel required. 
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because it gave sufficient but not excessive contrast from one value to the next.  Discrete 
distributions instead of continuous were used because they are more consistent with the 
actual mental process used by a manager and the less than exact nature of the assessment 
being made.  Personnel management is more art than science because it relies on making 
evaluations about people and applying experiences gathered from similar projects and 
situations.  Modeling an inexact process like this is statistically a difficult task.  In this 
case, the 1–10 scale was chosen because it both fit the needs of the modeling process and 
could be used to collect data in future research through surveys on real world 
applications. 
A constant number of tasks to be completed were used in each simulation.  Ten 
percent of the tasks were front loaded and available in a pool for assignment to an agent.  
The other 90% of the tasks were introduced into the simulation as it proceeded.  
Exponential distributions were used to randomly introduce new tasks that were 
independent of each other.  A mean arrival time was picked, that was small enough to 
ensure that the agents are never idle and waiting for new tasks to arrive. 
 Figure 32.   Firm model simulation process flow 
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Process Flow Point Description 
Agent creation Entities were created by ARENA to represent the agents (computer programmers) 
that perform the tasks of the project. 
Talent assigned The first entity created was assigned a talent level of eight.  This represents the 
Lead programmer.  Eight is reasonable because it is a relatively high talent level 
and is consistent with a programmer who has repeatedly proven himself on 
previous projects.  This number could be varied but the key is that this number 
must be equal to or be greater than the maximum difficulty assigned to any task. 
Sensitivity analysis on the simulation model found that an endless loop will be 
created if there is insufficient talent to perform the tasks.  The rest of the agent 




Talent variability is based on the fact that the agent's talent is being assessed by a 
third party in real life.  Consequently, incomplete specification is a factor.  Task 
assignment is based on the talent assigned but task performance is based on the 
revised talent after variability is applied. 
Task creation Entities were created by ARENA to represent the tasks that are necessary to 
complete the project.  The number of tasks created can be varied in the simulation 
to model different project sizes.  It was unreasonable to increase this number 
indefinitely though because this would be inconsistent with real life.  It would 
cause the project simulation time to increase without bound and endless projects 
are just not feasible or profitable.  To model large projects what should be done is 
to model the number of tasks that one level of the hierarchy would accomplish in 
the course of the project and then multiple those results for the number of project 
teams involved in the project. 
Difficulty and 
duration assigned 
Task difficulty and duration was assigned in one step.  In reality the difficulty is a 
function of the manager's assessment of the task.  In the simulation the difficulty is 
randomly assigned based on a probability distribution.  The distribution is skewed 
towards easier tasks to be consistent with actual projects.  Too many extremely 
difficult tasks make a project too risky to undertake. 
Duration was assigned randomly also.  To be consistent with the granular 
requirement of peer produced projects no task was assigned a notional duration 
greater than ten hours.  The minimum assigned is one hour. 
Difficulty variability 
assigned 
Difficulty variability is assigned by applying similar logic to that used to assign 
talent variability.  Difficulty variability is also a result of a manager's assessment of 
an incompletely specified task.  Agent assignment was based on task difficulty but 
task performance was a function of the revised difficulty after variability was 
applied. 
Agent/Task pairing Agent and task pairing is accomplished by evaluating the difference between an 
agent talent and the difficulty of all of the tasks in the queue waiting to be 
accomplished.  The most difficult task the agent is deemed capable of 
accomplishing is assigned. 
Duration variability 
and completion 
In real life, actual task duration is a function of the resources available, 
infrastructure in place, and many more factors.  For the purposes of this model, 
task duration was defined as a function of only two variables—talent and task 
 96
Process Flow Point Description 
determination difficulty.  In the simulation a weighting factor was used to adjust the task duration 
based on the different between actual talent and actual difficulty.  If actual 
difficulty is two or more units greater than actual talent than the agent will work on 
the task for the weighted duration but fail to complete it. 
Work accomplished The work accomplished process in the simulation is just a delay mechanism that 
prevents the task and agent from proceeding until the assigned duration has passed.  
If the agent had sufficient talent to perform the task then the task is tagged as 
complete.  If the task is too difficult for the agent assigned then it is tagged as a 
failure. 
Agent and Task 
separation 
Agent and Task separation is just a function of the simulation.  To permit work 
accomplishment the task and agent entities are actually combined into one entity.  
Once the work delay is satisfied the entities must be separated again to permit the 
task to be evaluated for completion and the agent to return and get another task 
assigned. 
Task rework decision Task rework decision evaluates the task that had just left work accomplishment for 
two things.  If the task was tagged as complete then nothing further is done and the 
task exits the system.  If it was tagged as failed then the number of times the task 
was worked on is evaluated.  If the task failed twice then it was labeled as an 
incomplete task and it left the system.  At this point the determination is that no 
agent is capable of completing the task so it is removed from the system.  When the 
simulation is complete the total number of incomplete tasks will be tallied.  The 
idea is that a certain number of these tasks could still be reworked.  Possibly the 
Lead Software Engineer could get involved to complete them directly or an outside 
contractor can be hired to accomplish the task.  Either way, the incomplete task 
represents a failure of the firm model.  In real life this equates to a schedule and 
cost overruns.  As some point the number of failed tasks will be great enough that 
no amount of rework is feasible and project failure will result. 
Difficulty reassessed Difficulty reassessment permits learning.  Once a task is attempted it is much 
closer to being fully specified.  Consequently, a more accurate difficulty 
assignment can be made.  In the simulation this means that difficulty is reassigned 
to equal the difficulty after variability was applied.  This permits reassignment of 
the task to a more talented agent for the rework. 
Task completion Statistics are taken on the completed and incomplete tasks and then the tasks exit 
the system. 









Variable Distribution Reason 
Talent Discrete PDF 
  5%      T = 8 
10%      T = 7 
15%      T = 6 
25%      T = 5 
25%      T = 4 
20%      T = 3 
T = Talent level assigned 
For a firm model it seems reasonable that the majority of 
agents will have an average talent level between four and 
six.  Only a few will have high or low talent levels.  High 




20%      AT = T -1 
75%      AT = T 
  5%      AT = T + 1 
AT = Actual talent of agent after variability applied 
The Probability Distribution Function for talent 
variability is skewed towards making agents less talented 
than they are originally assessed.  This is done to be 
consistent with how the firm model operates.  There is no 
incentive for an agent to be more talented than their boss 
thinks.  If an agent can accomplish a task then it is to their 
benefit to make sure their boss knows it.  The converse is 
not true; an agent will tend to present themselves in the 
best manner possible.  This may lead to a manager 
inaccurately assessing their talent as being higher than it 
actually is. 
Difficulty Triangle Distribution 
D = Triangle(2,5,8) 




  5%    AD = D - 2 
10%    AD = D - 1 
25%    AD = D 
40%    AD = D + 1 
20%    AD = D + 2 
AD = Actual task difficulty after variability applied 
It seems to be a reasonable assumption that tasks are often 
more difficult than expected.  Rarely do tasks turn out to 
be easier than expected.  This is also consistent with the 
number of projects that take longer than scheduled. 
Duration Uniform probability between 
1 and 10 hours to complete 
Dur = Uniform(1,10) 
Dur = Task duration assigned 
Duration 
variability 
Function of difference 
between AT and AD 
AD >= AT + 2,           RD 
=1.3*Dur                and task 
will fail 
AD >= AT + 1,            RD = 
1.3*Dur 
AD = AT,                     RD = 
1.1*Dur 
AD  < AT,                    RD = 
1.0*Dur 
RD = Realized duration after comparison made between 
AT and AD 
It is true that it is possible to complete a task in less time 
than expected but it is unrealistic to plan on this 
occurrence.  There may be disagreement on the weighting 
factors used to adjust task duration but the same factors 
were used in both the firm and PP simulation models.  
Any error introduced by these factors will be consistent 
across both models. 
Table 5.   Firm model variability distributions 
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2. Peer Production Model 
The Pure PP model (see Figures 33 and 34) derived describes the peer production 
process in general.  It is the starting point that can be tailored to portray specific projects 
in later research.  In this regard, the model has been verified to mirror the actual process 
but has not been validated with actual data.  For comparison sake, as many of the 
variability distributions as possible have been held constant between the firm model and 
PP model simulations.  Specifically, the same distributions are used to assign task 
difficulty and difficulty variability as well as duration variability.  Tasks are introduced 
with the same distribution in the temporal domain as in the firm models.  Talent 
variability is not used in the PP model however.  This is one of the characteristics of PP 
that results in an increase of project success probability over firm models of production.  
There is no incentive for a contributor in PP to take on a task that they cannot complete 
(Chapter IV, Section G).  No rewards are generated by failed attempts and the failure is 
directly attributable to the specific agent and not absorbed by the organization.  In the 
model this translated into no variability in the self-assessed talent of an agent.  An 
individual's talent is perfectly specified to herself.  This does not mean that a PP 
contributor is guaranteed to complete every task because the task difficulty is still 
incompletely specified. 
The generic process flow of the PP model is presented in Figures 33 and 34.  The 
process flow description is in Table 6 and Table 7.  Table 8 lists the distributions used in 
the model.  In the PP model there are two separate processes that occur.  The first 
represents the overhead associated with using the PP economic model of production.  The 
design and implementation sub-functions in the PP system represent this overhead.  The 
tasks that are performed in the PP process flow are termed "foundation blocks" and those 
performing them are called "founders".  In real life, this process flow corresponds to the 
work Linus Torvalds did before he released LINUX to the general programming public.  
It represents the work Jimmy Wales did to build the structure for Wikipedia and it 
represents the work done by NASA to create the system in which the Clickworkers 
contributed.  The work required to prepare a project for PP may be large or small.  It is 
going to be different for every project but as the above examples have demonstrated, it is 
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worth it.  Because this foundation process happens outside the PP process there is a cost 
associated with it.  This cost will be estimated in a manner similar to the manner in which 
the labor costs were estimated in the firm model.  An assumption will be made that the 
founders of the PP project are of the same skill level as the Lead Software Engineer in the 
firm model hierarchy.  As a result they will be assigned the same labor rate as the Lead 
Software Engineer.  This rate will be paid during the performance of the foundation 
blocks and throughout the PP process.  The last major characteristic of PP that must be 
accounted for in the model is the porous nature of the PP community.  PP is neither a 
hierarchical process nor a contractual one.  At any time contributors are free to enter and 
leave the community.  Consequently, there is a periodic introduction of agents into the PP 
process like the periodic introduction of tasks.  When a peer agent enters the community 
there is no way of knowing how long they will remain active and how many tasks they 
will accomplish during that time.  To determine this, information that has been collected 
about contributions to OSSD projects has been used.  Specifically, the work of 
contributors can be characterized into contribution deciles (Lerner & Tirole, 2002).  On 
average in OSSD, the top decile of contributors account for 72% of all contributions; the 
bottom decile of contributors contributes less than 1%.  The data reported by Lerner and 
Tirole (2002) was used to randomly assign each PP agent in the model a contribution 
decile and consequently a number of tasks that they will complete before departing the 
community.  The assignment of number of tasks to be completed was independent of 
talent level.  This is done to be consistent with actual PP processes.  An average 
programmer has just as much likelihood of being a top contributor in volume of work as 
does an expert programmer.  The only difference between them is in the difficulty of 
tasks they perform. 
 Figure 33.   PP model overhead process flow 
 100
 Figure 34.   PP model simulation process flows 
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These entities represent the tasks that must be accomplished to field the PP system. 
Duration 
assigned 
The same duration distribution is used as in the firm models.  Duration of tasks is 




It is assumed that the founders are highly qualified and are capable of performing any 
task necessary to create the PP system according to specifications.  Consequently no 
variability is used for the completion of the foundation blocks. 
Work 
accomplished 




This process is a function of how ARENA works.  Founder and foundation blocks are 
separated into two entities again. 
Route entities Founder is routed back to get another task.  Foundation block leaves the system 
Foundation block 
completion 
Completed foundation blocks exit here.  When the last foundation block exits a signal 
is sent to start the generation of agents and PP begins. 
Table 6.   PP simulation process flow explanation for overhead work to prepare a project for 




Agent creation Entities are created to represent the PP contributors. 
Talent Assigned Talent is assigned randomly as the agent entity passes through.  A value between 2 and 
10 will be assigned based on a discrete PDF 
Participation 
decile assigned 
Agents are randomly assigned one of ten participation deciles.  Their participation 
decile determines how long they will remain part of the community and how many 
tasks they will perform during that time.  It is based on the results of the study by 
Lerner and Tirole. 
Number of tasks 
to be completed 
assigned 
The number of tasks to be completed is a function of the number of agents predicted to 
join the community and the percentage of work the agent's respective decile is 
predicted to accomplish.  In the simulation the number of agents predicted is the 
number of agent entities that will be created. 
Number to be completed is equal to: 






Task creation Entities are created by ARENA to represent the tasks that are necessary to complete 
the project.  The number of tasks created can be varied in the simulation to model 
different project sizes.  It is not reasonable to increase this number indefinitely because 
this would be inconsistent with real life.  It would cause the project simulation time to 
increase without bound and endless projects are just not feasible. 
Difficulty and 
duration assigned 
Task difficulty and duration is assigned in one step.  In a real PP process the initial 
difficulty will either be assessed by a founder, or another member of the community.  
In the simulation, the difficulty is randomly assigned based on a probability 
distribution.  For comparison sake, the same distribution is used as the one in the firm 
model simulation. 
Duration is assigned randomly also in the same manner as in the firm model 
simulation.  The minimum assigned is one hour and the maximum 10. 
Task duplication Task duplication is one of the unique characteristics of PP.  In the firm model if a task 
was assigned to more than one agent it represented a waste of resources.  This is not 
the case in PP.  There is nothing preventing a PP agent from working on a task that is 
already being worked by another.  Of course, choosing to do so potentially reduces the 
reward that the agent may receive but it does nothing to adversely affect the efficiently 
of the project as a whole. 
In the simulation, before the task and agent are paired together a duplicate is made of 





Same process as the firm model 
Task search Task search represents the self selection process of PP.  In the firm model task pairing 
was done by the manager, In PP it is accomplished by each individual. 
Wait for 
appropriate task 
Because tasks are self-selected it is necessary to have a waiting area in the simulation 
for the agents to queue in while waiting for an appropriate task.  In the firm model, if 
there is no difficulty level-8 tasks for the agent to work on then there will be assigned a 
7 or 6 or 5 and so on.  It is a loss of efficiency to have them idle when there is still 
work to be accomplished.  In PP this is not a loss of efficiency.  Because contributors 
perform takes based on their value from the reward equation there is little value to be 
gained by an expert programmer working on a mundane task.  Consequently if there 








Same as the firm model.  Restated below for completeness. 
In real life, actual task duration is a function of actual agent talent and actual task 





determination on the different between actual talent and actual difficulty.  If actual difficulty is 2 or 
more units greater than actual talent than the agent will work on the task for the 
weighted duration but fail to complete it. 
Work 
accomplished 
The work accomplished process in the simulation is just a delay mechanism that 
prevents the task and agent from proceeding until the assigned duration has passed.  If 
the agent has sufficient talent to perform the task then is tagged as complete.  If the 
task is too difficult for the agent assigned then it is tagged as a failure. 
Separate agent 
and task 
Agent and Task separation is just a function of the simulation.  To permit work 
accomplishment that task and agent entities are actually combined into one entity.  
Once the work delay is satisfied the entities must be separated again to permit the task 
to be evaluated for completion and the agent to continue on. 
Increment task 
counter 
This process keeps track of how many tasks each agent has accomplished.   
Stay or leave 
decision 
The number on the agent's task counter is compared with the number of task to be 
completed by that agent.  When they are equal the agent leaves the system. 
Agent leaves Statistics are collected and the entity leaves the system. 
Task failure 
check 
Task rework decision evaluates the task that just left work accomplishment.  If it was 
tagged as complete then the task proceeds on to duplicate task removal.  If the task was 
tagged as a failure then it proceeds on to difficulty reassessment. 
Remove 
duplicate task 
Duplicate task removal symbolizes the process of a contributor updating the 
community that a task is complete.  On the community knows that it has been 
accomplished agent will cease to select it for accomplishment. 
In the simulation this is done by removing the duplicate task that was made from the 
waiting tasks queue.  




Difficultly reassessment permits the community to learn.  Once a task is attempted it is 
much closer to being fully specified.  If a contributor fails yes shares the problem with 
the community so a more accurate assessment of the difficulty involved can be made.  
In the simulation this means that difficulty is reassigned to equal the difficulty after 
variability was applied.  This permits the task to be self-selected by a more talented 
contributor. 
Table 7.   PP simulation process flow explanation for the process of producing a product 





Variable Distribution Reason 
Talent Discrete PDF 
  5%      T = 2 
10%      T = 3 
25%      T = 4 
30%      T = 5 
20%      T = 6 
  5%      T = 7 
  2%      T = 8 
  2%      T = 9 
  1%     T = 10 
T = Talent level assigned 
Talent is assigned based a PDF that represents the 
probability that a person interested in this type of project 
will have a given talent for performing tasks to support it.  
The distribution is centered on the mid level talents.  40% 
of contributors will be assigned a talent less than or equal 
to four, 55% will be assigned a talent between five and 
seven, and 5% will be given talent greater than or equal to 
eight.  This is consistent with the reward equation.  It is the 
mid skill levels that have the most to benefit from 
contributing.  They will typically be the ones whose 
profession is in the field for which they are participating, 
consequently they can experience the most gain from 
increased exposure to the field and their peers.  Since they 




Constant Probability = 
10% 
Entities have a 10% chance of being assigned to each of 
the ten contribution deciles. 
Number of 
task to be 
completed 
Top decile           72% 
2nd decile           9.0% 
3rd                      6.0% 
4th                      4.0% 
5th                      3.5% 
6th                      3.0% 
7th                      1.5% 
8th                      0.5% 
9th                      0.4% 
10th                    0.1% 
Based on the research presented in Some simple economics 
of Open Source, Lerner and Tirole (2002). 
Difficulty Triangle Distribution 
D = Triangle(2,5,8) 




  5%  AD = D - 2 
10%  AD = D - 1 
25%  AD = D 
40%  AD = D + 1 
20%  AD = D + 2 
AD = Actual task difficulty after variability applied 
It seems to be a reasonable assumption that tasks are more 
often harder than they are easier.  This is also consistent 
with the number of projects that take longer than 
scheduled. 
Duration Uniform probability 
between 1 and 10 hours to 
complete 
Dur = Uniform(1,10) 
Dur = Task duration assigned 
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Variable Distribution Reason 
Duration 
variability 
Function of difference 
between AT and AD 
AD >= AT + 2,           RD 
=1.3*Dur                and 
task will fail 
AD >= AT + 1,            RD 
= 1.3*Dur 
AD = AT,                     RD 
= 1.1*Dur 
AD  < AT,                    RD 
= 1.0*Dur 
RD = Realized duration after comparison made between 
AT and AD 
It is true that it is possible to complete a task in less time 
than expected but it is unrealistic to plan on this 
occurrence.  There may be disagreement on the weighting 
factors used to adjust task duration but the same factors 
were used in both the firm and PP simulation models.  Any 
error introduced by these factors will be consistent across 
both models. 
Table 8.   PP model variability distributions 
3. Simulation Results 
Two simulation runs were conducted.  The first was to demonstrate the effects of 
incomplete specification of agent talent and task difficulty on the firm model of 
production.  In this trial, the real and ideal Firm Models were compared.  A second set of 
1000 replications was conducted to compare the real Firm Model with the Peer 
Production Model.  In this trial the incomplete specification of the tasks was the same for 
both models.  The PP Model however does not succumb to incomplete talent 
specification due to agent self-selection.  The results of both trials are below. 
a. Firm Simulation Results 
Simulation runs using six and twelve agents were conducted to see the 
effects of team size on project time and cost.  Six and twelve agents were used, because 
they represent the opposite ends of what is typically viewed in industry as an effective 
team size.  Less than six and managers are underutilized.  Over twelve and performance 
suffers because managers are overburdened. 
A 30% increase in time to complete all tasks was seen when variability 
was added to the firm model.  This was consistent across both the six and twelve agent 
trials.  See Figure 35.  Variability in talent and difficulty also produced a rework rate of 
5–8% and a failure rate of 1–3% for tasks.  Rework occurred when a task "failed" the first 
time because task difficulty was greater than the agent talent.  A task was deemed 
"incomplete" after it was worked twice and still was not completed successfully.  Failure 
rate is discussed in conjunction with the PP model results (Figure 37). 
   
Figure 35.   Firm Model Simulation Average Trial Completion Time 
Simulation time represents continuous work time or the amount of 
productive work time necessary to complete the project.  To relate simulation time to 
actual project duration, the simulation time was divided by some average number of 
effective hours per week.  Thirty hours of a 40-hour workweek was used as productive 
time.  The rest is “lost” time for meetings, breaks, email, etc.  The project time in weeks 
(sim time/30) does not take into account long weekends, vacations, sick-time, employee 
turnover, and holidays. As a result, the actual project time will be even longer than 
simulated.  To get the labor cost, the average weekly salary * number of agents * number 




Figure 36.   Firm Model Simulation Average Trial Completion Cost 
To calculate project cost a notional salary was assigned to each agent 
based on talent level.  For simplicity sake, a salary of $10,000 per year was awarded for 
each talent point.  Therefore, an agent with a talent of eight would earn $80,000 and an 
intern with a three for talent would earn $30,000.  For the firm models, project cost was 
equal to: 
Average Talent * Number of Agents * $10,000 * (sim tim/30) * .02 
The average talent in the simulation trials was 6.67 for the six-agent trial and 7.33 for the 
12-agent trial.  This average was a result of the random talent distribution used by 
ARENA.  As seen in Figure 36, there was a 30% increase in project cost due to 
incomplete specification of agent talent and task difficulty. 
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b. PP Simulation Results 
The PP model simulation provided more information about the PP process 
that initially expected.  There was a need for 20–50 PP agents for every firm agent to 
complete all tasks of the project.  This was a result of the porous nature of the PP 
community.  None of the contributors entered that community at the start of the project, 
nor did they necessarily stay until the project was completed. 
The time to complete the project did not seem to be a function of the 
number of agents but rather a function of the rate at which the agents joined the 
community.  The Clickworkers project showed that the rate of joining was a function of 
publicity for the project and as a result could be influenced.  This influence was beyond 
the scope of this research. 
The other result of the PP simulation was that 1/3 to 1/2 of the contributors 
were left in the system when all of the tasks were completed.  This meant they had not 
yet reached the limit of their contribution decile.  In a real PP system this is the source of 
the increased rate of innovation.  In actual PP projects, individuals will do one of two 
things when there is a shortage of tasks.  They will either come up with their own task to 
do to make the project better or they will wait in standby until a new bug or idea arises.  
There is simply no way to accomplish this in the firm model.  Firm agents are always 
busy just doing the required tasks. 
c. Firm and PP Simulations Compared 
Comparisons were made between the real firm model and the PP model in 
the following areas: average number of incomplete tasks per trial (Figure 37), task 
duplication factor (Figure 38), simulation time (Figure 39), and project cost (Figure 40).  
The results supported all claims about the benefits of PP. 
 
Figure 37.   Average Number of Incomplete Tasks Per Simulation Trial (variance depicted is 
for 95% confidence interval) 
Figure 37 provides the evidence for the claim that PP can increase the 
success probability of a project as a whole.  This is done by significantly reducing the 
number of individual tasks that cannot be accomplished.  The real world example that 
validates this claim is the InnoCentive model.   
The underlying benefits to a reduced task failure rate are also significant.  
The evaluation criteria to characterize a task as "failed" after two unsuccessful 
completion attempts was incorporated into the PP simulation to provide a comparison 
point with the Firm model.  In the PP model there was no need to designate a task as 
failed. Rather the task would just stay in the queue until it is completed successfully. 
The 0.3 failed tasks per simulation trial could be eliminated completely 
because of two attributes of the PP process.  First, there is no labor cost associated with 
repeating the task over and over again.  Second, and more importantly, the labor pool is 
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under continuous renewal so there is always new talent that can try the task again.  After 
enough attempts the task will either be completed or deemed "unsolvable" (which is 
different than "failed"). 
 
Figure 38.   Task Duplication Factor Compared 
A corollary to reduced task failure is seen in Figure 38.  Task duplication 
is defined as completing a task multiple times regardless of successful completion.  Task 
duplication is not automatically built into the Firm model as it is in the PP model.  To get 
task duplication in the Firm model resources must be allocated to do the completion 
check.  This does not always mean that the task is completed independently all over again 
although this is sometimes true.  Other times task duplication may just be checking the 
work over and "signing it off".  In either case, resources are expended and in the Firm 
model this means cost is added to the bottom line.  As shown in Figure 38, no task 
duplication was built into the Firm model simulation and consequently none occurred. 
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No task duplication was built into the PP model either but, on average, 
42% of the tasks in each simulation were completed successfully more than once.  This is 
a natural duplication that results from a subtle difference between the Firm and PP 
processes.  This subtle difference however leads to profound differences in the outcome 
of the models. 
In the Firm model a task comes out of the "waiting to be done" queue 
when it is assigned to an agent to accomplish.  This is consistent with how real firms 
operate (unless they are willing to pay for duplication factor).  Typically, when a task is 
assigned to one person it is not assigned to another until the first proves incapable.  In the 
PP process tasks are not removed from the "waiting to be done" queue until they are 
reported as completed.  The 42% duplication factor is "natural" because it represents the 
percentage of tasks that were self-selected by multiple agents before the first successful 
accomplishment of that particular task was reported.  Duplication factor can be increased 
to essentially and degree.  One hundred percent duplication (i.e., every task completed 
twice) can easily be achieved by not removing the task from the queue until it is 
completed twice.  Of course something greater than 100% duplication will actually be 
experienced because agents will continue to work on the task to completion even after the 
duplication factor quota is met.  The Clickworkers experiment is an example of 
duplication factor in practice.  The Clickworkers process achieved confidence in the PP 
result by never removing the task from the queue.  As more and more agents identified a 
crater in a particular location during the Clickworkers experiment; the probability that 
there was a crater in that location increased.  Eventually, the Clickworkers model 
produced results with equivalent certainty as if the work was performed by a trained 
expert. 
 
Figure 39.   Average Trial Simulation Times Compared (variance depicted is for a 95% 
confidence interval) 
It has been shown that the PP model provides both a higher probability of 
success and higher duplication factor than the firm model.  Figure 39 shows that these 
benefits are obtained without increase in overall project completion time.  Figure 39 is 
somewhat arbitrary however.  As was previously stated, PP project completion is 
dependent more on the peer contributor introduction rate and appears to be independent 
of the particular project being completed.  As a result, completion time is directly related 
to a successful publicity plan and a technically capable communication medium to 
compile contributions.  Statistically these claims are supported by the relatively small 
dispersion seen around the PP simulation trial completion time.  Over all the trials, the 




Figure 40.   Real Firm Model Vs. PP Model Average Trial Simulated Cost 
The last item to compare is simulated project cost.  Figure 40 shows that 
the PP model is also highly cost effective.  This should not be surprising.  The Firm 
models had six and 12 individuals on the payroll for the duration of the project.  The PP 
model had only two.  The two individuals in the PP model simulation were assumed to be 
super experts and given a salary commiserate with a talent equal to ten ($100,000/year).  
The highest paid agent in either Firm model earned $80,000/yr, commensurate with a 
talent equal to eight.  So, even with a significantly higher average salary the PP model 
still cost significantly less to complete the same work in the Firm model. 
The process of simulating the PP process provides great insight into how 
the process works.  In doing so it also provided objective evidence to correlate with the 
subjective evidence of real world examples.  It has shown that the PP model, when 
applied to a properly structured project, has a higher probability of success, a higher 
duplication factor, a comparable project completion time, and a lower project cost.  
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Consequently, little valid argument can be made against making the necessary 
organizational changes necessary to adapt and apply the PP process when appropriate. 
F. APPLYING THE PP MODEL 
1. Three Classes of PP 
The application of peer production is divided into four categories of which three 
are relevant to the DoD application of PP.  The omitted class of PP is independent PP.  It 
is the PP that involves a peer community that has no relationship with a traditional 
hierarchical organization.  The differences between the remaining three categories 
revolve around the location of the peer contributors with respect to the firm boundary and 
the direction of flow of the project output. 
a. Internal PP 
 
Figure 41.   Internal PP 
Internal PP, Figure 41, has the peer community inside the boundaries of 
the larger firm.  Xerox's Eureka project is an example of this and is discussed in 
Appendix A.  Many of the applications for the DoD fall into this class of PP, particularly 
those involving maintenance, logistics and supply, and fleet support.  The biggest 
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challenge to implementing this class is permitting voluntary participation in the peer 
community.  In order for PP to work the process cannot be mandated by the external firm 
hierarchy. 
b. Outside-In PP 
 
Figure 42.   Outside-In PP 
Outside-In PP, Figure 42, is the type of PP that is most visible in today's 
marketplace.  Here the peer community is comprised of individuals that exist outside the 
firm boundary.  Although the individual peers receive some reward for their contribution 
the specific output of the project is directed at benefiting the firm.  Utilization of this 
class of PP will afford the DoD the greatest return on investment.  It involves permitting 
individual to voluntarily perform tasks the DoD traditionally contracts..  The area to look 
for these types of applications is not in the core tasks of the military but in the fringe 
activities must be performed to sustain performance of the core tasks.  These activities 
include things like family support, health care, and advertising. 
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c. Inside-Out PP 
 
Figure 43.   Inside-Out PP 
Inside-Out PP, as seen in Figure 43, can be thought of as service oriented 
PP.  Here the firm is compiling and integrating the contributions of a peer community and 
returns some product to that community from which they receive a benefit.  The firm 
derives reward from this integration activity through some complementary process.  
Wikipedia and Google are the best examples of this class.  Wikipedia takes explicit 
contributions from peers and returns a unified Web-based encyclopedia to them for their 
use.  Google takes implicit contributions in the form of Web page links and compiles 
them into an effective Web search engine.  If you consider national defense the service 
that is provided to the peer community, DoD sponsored PP could be broadly placed into 
this category, although the application of individual projects will look more like the other 
classes. 
2. The Big Picture 
The beauty of implementing PP within the DoD is that is does not require an 
explicit statement of a change in policy like was seen with the pursuit of network-centric 
warfare.  What is necessary is an internal commitment to seek out the benefits of PP and 
apply it in a manner consistent with the principle of PP.  After that, each individual 
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application of PP is a stand-alone system that is independent of other PP systems.  This 
permits a very low risk, gradual application of PP techniques that begins with the obvious 
applications.  It can proceed to other applications as more comfort and experience is 
gained with applying the methodology and after success has been demonstrated. 
Over time, after repeated application of PP to the point where it is fully integrated 
into the manner in which the DoD operates, a sweeping organization change will occur.  
This can best be seen in Figure 44, where the individual peer networks represent specific 
independent applications of the PP methodology. 
 
Figure 44.   Cumulative picture of DoD PP 
With fully integrated PP, the "tip of the spear" functions the same way, but the 
waves of support that are behind that warfighter is fully infiltrated with PP processes.  
The operational picture presented in Figure 44, can then be expanded to support concepts 
like the 1,000 Ship Navy and the Global Maritime Partnership.  To meet this need simply 
add another wave of support behind the taxpayer and label it "international community". 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
A. REVIEW AND SUMMARY 
PP is an economic model of production where individual peer contributions are 
integrated into a unified intelligible whole.  It functions within the networked information 
economy, and is fueled by the presence of a ubiquitous personal computing power.  The 
emergence of this new economic model is consistent with the accepted principles of 
transaction cost economics.  It takes advantage of greatly reduced transaction costs for 
the exchange of knowledge, information, and culture. 
Peer contributions are regulated by the reward equation: 
R = M + H + SP where 
R = individual agents reward for performing an action 
M = Monetary compensation 
H = Hedonistic rewards 
SP = Social-psychological rewards 
The driving force for these contributions is primarily based on the H and SP 
reward components.  From these potential rewards, would-be contributors assess a value 
of participation and weigh it against the cost of contributing.  The cost for most 
participation is typically a function of the time it takes.  The ideal candidate has a surplus 
of time and consequently will have a V/C ratio significantly greater than one.  As long as 
the V/C remains greater than one, participation is likely to occur. 
In order to be eligible for PP, there are characteristics which a potential project 
must have.  It must be modular.  Modularity refers to the degree which a project can be 
divided into smaller independent tasks that can be distributed for completion.  It must 
also have a granularity that is consistent with the characteristics of the peer community.  
Granularity refers to the size of the modules in terms of the effort required to complete 
them.  In most cases a project should be comprised on non-uniform granularity.  This will 
enable tasks to be accomplished by a broad base of peers with different individual 
characteristics. 
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Organizationally, PP requires a hands-off approach from the sponsoring 
organization.  Peer contributions require self-selection.  A contributor must be able to 
decide for themselves which tasks provide the best V/C ratio.  This means that no 
hierarchical control can be exerted from outside or inside the peer community.  This 
requirement presents a significant challenge to the traditional organization within the 
military-industrial complex. 
It is self-selection that facilitates many of the gains experienced through PP.  It 
allows many of the costs of personnel management to be eliminated and efficiency gains 
are experienced because of it.  It also permits task duplication, which increases the 
probability of success for both the individual task and the project as a whole.  Finally, 
self-selection enables a larger rate of innovation because advances can be developed and 
implemented as soon as they are identified.  By modeling the PP process these potential 
benefits of PP have been notionally quantified. 
Until this research, the work on PP has been to describe the economic model and 
why it is used.  This work represents the first look at developing a systematic approach 
for applying PP routinely.  To accomplish this task a functional decomposition of PP was 
presented.  It was comprised of six top level functions which included: project 
preparation, PP system design. PP system implementation, community cultivation, 
rewards propagation, and results integration.  Using that functional decomposition as a 
template, permit PP to be customized for a variety of applications within the DoD. 
These applications fall into three broad categories of PP.  They are internal, 
outside-in and inside-out PP.  Internal applications will utilize a peer community that 
exists within the larger military hierarchy.  Outside-In PP will use an external PP to 
produce results that both directly and indirectly help the warfighter.  All DoD sponsored 
PP projects together can be broadly viewed as Inside-Out PP because the peer community 
is benefitting for the collective gains of PP applied within the military. 
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APPENDIX A: REAL WORLD EXAMPLES 
The examples presented below step through the functional decomposition of 
implementing PP within the scope of real world applications. 
A. NASA CLICKWORKERS 
The NASA Clickworkers case is a good example of how it is necessary to 
understand the need to be met, and also that it sometimes requires some significant 
creativity to identify a PP opportunity.  NASA's initial need analysis was to analyze the 
high resolution images of the surface of Mars.  Responding to this need, NASA initially 
hired experts, namely geologists with advanced degrees, to review each image of Mars 
and characterize the topography.  In practice this task amounted to simply identifying, 
classifying, and labeling craters.  After this task was accomplish a few thousand times 
and it was discovered to be an extremely tedious and time consuming process a new need 
was formulated. 
A faster way to characterize the Mars topography was needed.  To meet this need, 
NASA researchers turned to a distributed network of human processing power to 
accomplish the massive data analysis task.  The initial Clickworkers pilot sought to 
answer two questions:  (1) Are people willing to volunteer their free time for routine 
scientific work?  (2) Does an unspecified, anonymous public have the motivation and 
training to produce accurate results in a scientifically important task? (Kanefsky, Barlow, 
& Gulick, 2001)  This process of need identification and research question specification 
is consistent with top-level function 1.0 - Prepare the PP project.  Because it was not 
known if the public would be technically capable of producing the required quality the 
pilot program used previously cataloged data.  Specifically, image maps containing 
42,284 already classified craters were used.  This inventory was an example of "a data 
product that is time-consuming to produce, difficult to automate, and scientifically 
important" (Kanefsky, Barlow, & Gulick, 2001).   
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Execution of peer produced topography classification began by establishing an 
interactive Website to host the Mars lunar images and collect individual classification 
contributions.  A portion of the Website was devoted to training the analytical workforce.  
The training supplied directions for making two different types of contributions, crater 
identification and crater classification.  To identify a crater, would be contributors were 
instructed to mark with a mouse click four points on a crater rim.  After the forth point 
was inputted a circle outlining the crater was drawn automatically.  If the contributor 
agreed with the crater position then a "submit" button was pressed and the latitude, 
longitude, and diameter of the crater were recorded in the project database.  A training 
program with seven known craters gave accuracy feedback, as each was identified and 
marked.  If desired by the contributor, hints and/or a demonstration were available on 
where to find the next crater. 
The second task of crater classification was presented as an additional task that 
required more judgment.  To accomplish this task a contributor was presented an image 
with a single crater already identified and asked to fit the crater into one of three age 
classes.  A description and example of each age class was supplied and an additional 
animation of crater erosion was available.  The process of Website design, contributor 
training, database integration are all tasks that are part of top-level function 2.0, Design 
of the peer production system.  The key to the system success however is what happens 
to the individual contribution.  Through automated database manipulations, individual 
contributions are combined into a weighted average for actual crater location.  It was 
these weighted averages that were compared to the predetermined crater locations.  This 
automated integration function is the key to this successful PP application.  This is 
ultimately what permitted crater identification to be accomplished rigorously and quicker 
in a distributed fashion than in the more traditional expert conducted analysis. 
The design of this PP system highlights the requirement for the requested tasks to 
be both granular and modular.  Clickworkers met both requirements in the simplest 
manner.  Both the tasks of identification and classification of craters are of the finest 
granularity.  This granularity allows an individual contributor with a lot or a little bit of 
spare time to contribute.  Modularity is achieved by offering two types of tasks to the 
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contributor.  One task is simple and the other requires slightly more effort and thought.  
This modularity promotes continued contributions from the peers by providing a varied 
experience. 
The effectiveness of the Clickworkers experiment in accomplishing the desired 
task is best evaluated by considering the quantity and quality of the results.  After the 
initial wave of targeted publicity for the project, 800 contributors participated over the 
first four days and marked over 30,000 craters.  Within the first three weeks 90,000 
craters were identified.  The classification task returned 8,000 entries in four days and 
21,000 within three weeks.  Both results were achieved faster than a single graduate 
student could have accomplished.  It is also worth noting that one time visitors to the site 
accomplished 37% of the work (Kanefsky, Barlow & Gulick, 2001).  In terms of quality, 
a systematic comparison of thousands of Clickworker identified craters shown the peer 
produced results to be within a few pixels of the accepted catalog positions.  The 
differences that did result between Clickworker and accepted positions were consistent in 
size to errors seen by comparing craters evaluated by Barlow on independent occasions. 
The Clickworkers experiment represents the simplest of PP systems.  This 
example also demonstrates the effectiveness of PP for certain tasks while highlighting 
some of the necessary design features of a successful PP system. 
B. INNOCENTIVE 
InnoCentive, a Web-based company, that matches problems with would-be 
solvers in an example of a successful reward system employed inside a PP construct.  
InnoCentive provides a forum for "seekers" to post problems to which they need 
solutions.  The Website, www.InnoCentive.com, categorizes the problems into 
disciplines and enables solvers to search for a problem to which they may know the 
answer.  In return for a viable solution the solver receives professional recognition and 
financial awards. 
Seekers are typically corporations with an R & D need that they either cannot or 
choose not to solve using "in-house" resources.  In return for the solution the companies 
offer a pre-determined monetary reward for an acceptable solution.  The seeking 
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company determines both the amount of reward and definition of an acceptable solution.  
InnoCentive handles the solicitation and collection of potential solutions.  One of the 
largest corporate users of InnoCentive is Proctor and Gamble.  Once the problem, 
associated reward and required deadline are posted on InnoCentive potential solvers 
compete for the reward.  The InnoCentive process exemplifies two of the most essential 
characteristics of a PP system perfectly.  They are self-selection and anonymity. 
Self-selection is the most import characteristic from the perspective of the peer 
contributor; self-selection is what permits a contributor to maximize their return on 
investment.  Anonymity is what results when control is relinquished by the firm.  
Anonymity requires the firm to focus on the task and not the performer of the task.  This 
is what Proctor and Gamble has successfully done through their use of InnoCentive.  As a 
result P & G obtains more than 50% of its new product ideas from outside the firm 
boundaries. 
C. XEROX EUREKA 
Eureka is a system designed, developed, and deployed by the Xerox Corporation 
in the early 1990's to support the Customer Service Engineers (CSEs) who repaired the 
copiers and printers at customer locations.  The need for this system arose from a 
shortfall in the technically skilled workforce.  Xerox was forced to hire less skilled, less 
experienced workers.  Because the new employees were less technically competent upon 
hire Xerox moved away from documentation and training that described the principles of 
product operation.  This type of documentation required technicians to diagnose and 
repair the equipment on their own.  Instead directive repair and adjustment procedures in 
the form of decision tress were substituted.  The CSEs quickly discovered that the 
documentation was never complete enough to encompass even a majority of the problems 
encountered in the field.  As a result, repair time and cost went up drastically and 
customer satisfaction plummeted.  A better way of supporting the CSE had to be found. 
By observing how the CSEs actually performed their jobs, researchers Daniel 
Bobrow and Jack Whalen from the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center found that is was 
local communities of repair technicians that facilitated the repairs in the field.  Because 
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the corporately supplied documentation was incomplete and the technical background of 
many CSEs was insufficient, repairs were often accomplished through trial and error.  
(This is what drove average repair time and cost up.)  Once a solution was found to a 
"never before seen" problem the solutions were shared informally among local 
communities of CSEs.  Some groups even formalized the process by creating and sharing 
cheat sheets.  After witnessing this, Bobrow and Whalen set out to create a system that 
would allow these communities to share their solutions across the entire enterprise.  The 
system that resulted was called Eureka. 
As developers worked with CSEs to create Eureka four questions were posed that 
get at the heart of the development of a PP system.  They were: 
 If a CSE submitted a tip, would it disappear into a black hole? 
 Would the CSE get credit? 
 How would they know they could trust all the tips? 
 How would they get the right tips at the right time? 
The first question pertains directly to the development of the peer community and an 
individual's V/C ratio.  Submitting a tip to the system is only worth a person's time (Cost) 
if he can see the results (Value).  Question 2 relates directly to the Reward Equation.  
Hedonistic (H) and Social-Psychological (SP) rewards are only possible when 
contributions are documented with who contributed them.  It is important to note the 
CSEs that tested the pilot program communicated that there should be no monetary 
reward for contributing tips to the database.  Monetary rewards would put the focus on 
the number of tips produced and not the quality and would also create unnecessary 
competition that would be counter to the goals of the community. 
Questions 3 and 4 above relate to the design and implementation of a PP system.  
Validation of peer contributions needs to be accomplished in any PP system.  In the case 
of the Eureka project, a "validator" known for expertise on the particular product line 
certifies each tip before it is released to the wider peer community.  Getting the right tips 
at the right time is a usability issue.  It does no good to save 20 minutes on a repair if it 
takes 30 minutes to find the shortcut.  With Eureka this was taken into account by 
addressing both a hardware and software issue.  A multi-input search function was used 
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to get the CSE to the correct information quickly and the program was loaded onto 
communication equipment that the CSE already carried thereby eliminating the need for 
new gear and training.  The design features were vital to the success of the project and 
they highlight the necessity to make the peer community the central focus of system 
design and implementation. 
The pilot program was run across Xerox's French market.  The tip database 
started with support for three products.  By the end of the first year the database had 
grown to more than 40 products.  Also by the end of the first year, more than one tip was 
being added each day, more that 20% of the CSEs had submitted a tip and CSEs were 
consulting the tip database an average of two or more times a week.  In that same year the 
French service metrics went from below average when compared to the rest of Europe to 
a benchmark performer.  Metrics were soon better than the European average by 5–20%, 
depending on the product. 
The results experienced through Eureka far exceeded anyone's expectations at 
Xerox.  Customer satisfaction rose and repair cost dropped because of it.  Secondary 
effects seen were increased employee job satisfaction and retention.  These were also 
unexpected.  Today, the Eureka story is an excellent example of Internal PP and the 
power of PP in general. 
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APPENDIX B: COMPLETE PEER PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSTION 
1. Prepare the project 
1.1. Conduct need analysis 
1.1.1. Determine the process to which improvement is sought 
1.1.1.1. Research current conditions 
1.1.1.2. Determine where improvements are necessary 
1.1.2. Specify Objectives 
1.1.2.1. Determine the beginning state 
1.1.2.2. Identify the desired end state 
1.1.2.3. Identify possible ripple effects from desired end state 
1.2. Determine if portion of need can be met through PP methodology 
1.2.1. Determine if community of peers is possible 
1.2.1.1. Consider anyone who is capable of performing tasks 
1.2.1.2. Determine if community already exists 
1.2.1.3. Consider availability of individuals with skills required 
1.2.1.4. Determine V/C ration of potential peer producers 
1.2.1.5. Evaluate reward characteristics for performing required tasks 
1.2.2. Determine granularity of project tasks 
1.2.2.1. Determine if project requirements can be redefined to increases 
granularity 
1.2.2.2. Group tasks into up to three granularity groups 
1.2.2.3. Subdivide granularity groups into talent requirements 
1.2.3. Determine modularity of project tasks 
1.2.3.1. Determine if project requirements can be adjusted to increase 
modularity 
1.2.3.2. Determine if project has uniform or disparate modularity size 
1.2.3.3. Determine the fidelity to which the module requirements are 
known 
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1.2.3.4. Determine if  peer innovation is acceptable 
1.2.3.5. Determine number of initial modules 
1.2.3.6. Determine number of total modules to complete system 
1.2.4. Determine integration methodology 
1.2.4.1. Determine degree of task duplication necessary to provide 
necessary confidence 
1.2.4.2. Automate integration if possible 
1.2.4.3. Estimate integration complexity 
1.2.4.4. Determine manning requirements for non-automated integration 
1.2.4.5. Determine if project is discrete or continuous 
1.2.5. Model project 
1.2.5.1. Evaluate community size required 
1.2.5.2. Estimate project duration 
1.2.5.3. Estimate cost 
1.3. Outline the application of PP to problem 
1.3.1. State reason for applying PP 
1.3.2. Define operational model 
1.3.3. Define business model 
1.3.4. Identify possible ripple effects from applying PP in this manner 
1.3.4.1. Identify good effects 
1.3.4.1.1. Potential future applications of same system 
1.3.4.1.2. Secondary effects of system 
1.3.4.2. Identify potential negative effects 
1.3.4.2.1. Security risks 
1.3.4.2.2. Legal issues 
1.3.4.2.3. Negative publicity 
1.3.4.2.4. Malevolent agents 
2. Design the peer system 












2.1.4.1. Technology compatibility 
2.1.4.2. Security 
2.1.4.3. Authentication 
2.2. Determine necessary technologies to meet requirements 
2.2.1. Consider what is necessary for peer community to be successful 
2.2.1.1. Identify peer needs to perform tasks 
2.2.1.2. Identify peer needs to experience rewards 
2.2.1.3. Identify peer needs to promote active community 
2.2.2. Determine what information format is necessary for project success 
2.2.3. Determine suspected communication volume 
2.2.4. Determine required community size 
2.3. Determine course of action 
2.3.1. Identify work packages 
2.3.2. Determine schedule 
2.3.3. Determine budget 
2.4. Identify Stakeholders 
2.4.1. Contributors 






2.4.7. Reporting seniors 
2.4.8. Concerned parties 
2.4.9. Inspectors 
2.5. Estimate needed resources 




2.5.1.4. Human Resources 
2.5.1.5. Financial 
2.5.2. Estimate funds to field the PP system 
2.5.2.1. Equipment funds 
2.5.2.2. Travel funds 
2.5.2.3. Training funds 
2.5.3. List equipment necessary to field PP system 
2.5.3.1. System equipment 
2.5.3.2. Testing equipment 
2.5.3.3. Training equipment 
2.5.3.4. Repair equipment 
2.5.4. Determine project process flow 
2.5.4.1. Work Flow 
2.5.4.2. Communication Flow 
2.5.4.3. Compensation Flow 
2.5.4.4. Information Flow 
2.5.5. Conduct risk mitigation 
2.5.5.1. Define "risks" 
2.5.5.1.1. Technical risks 
2.5.5.1.2. Schedule risks 
2.5.5.1.3. Cost risks 
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2.5.5.2. Implement identification techniques 
2.5.5.2.1. Establish Risk Management Board 
2.5.5.2.2. Utilize lessons learned from previous projects 
2.5.5.2.3. Identify shortfalls between needs and resources 
2.5.5.2.4. Peer review of project plans 
2.5.5.3. Document all risks captured during identification 
2.5.5.4. Assess risks 
2.5.5.4.1. Probability of occurrence 
2.5.5.4.2. Consequences of occurrence 
2.5.5.4.3. Categorize assessments 
2.5.5.5. Mitigate risks 
2.5.5.5.1. Develop contingency plans 
2.5.5.5.2. Monitor risks 
2.5.5.5.3. Implement contingency plans as necessary 
2.5.5.5.4. Monitor success of contingency plan 
2.5.6. Identify external information needed 
2.5.6.1. Schedule information 
2.5.6.2. Data feeds 




2.6. Design communication flow 
2.6.1. Design communication system from founders to peer community 
2.6.1.1. Provide mass distributions capability 
2.6.1.2. Provide subgroup distribution capability 
2.6.1.3. Permit individual communication 
2.6.2. Design communication system between peers 
2.6.2.1. Provide social network tools 
2.6.2.2. Provide asynchronous collaboration tools 
 134
2.6.2.3. Provide synchronous collaboration tools 
2.6.3. Design communication system from peers to founders 
2.6.4. Design communications from peer community to public 
2.6.5. Design communications from founders to public 
2.6.6. Design communications from public to founders 
2.7. Design integration subsystem 
2.7.1. Track changes to project 
2.7.2. Track contributors 
2.7.3. Collect contributions 
2.7.4. Combine contributions into intelligible whole 
2.7.5. Validate contributions 
2.8. Test system 
2.8.1. Define test objectives 
2.8.2. Develop test 
2.8.2.1. Measures of effectiveness 
2.8.2.2. Measures of performance 
2.8.3. Plan test 
2.8.3.1. Data collection plan 
2.8.3.2. Data analysis plan 
2.8.3.3. Reports plan 
2.8.4. Execute test 
2.8.4.1. Safety 
2.8.4.2. Variability from design 
2.8.4.3. Collect data 
2.8.5. Analyze test results 
2.8.6. Report results 
3. Implement PP system 
3.1. Field system 
3.1.1. Determine implementation schedule 
3.1.1.1. Coverage area sequencing 
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3.1.1.2. Maximize initial effectiveness 
3.1.1.3. Minimize operational disruptions 
3.1.2. Install first increment 
3.1.2.1. Conduct training 
3.1.2.2. Answer questions 
3.1.2.3. Fix bugs 
3.1.2.4. Gather data 
3.1.2.5. Compile lessons learned 
3.1.2.6. Report performance 
3.1.2.7. Repeat as necessary 
3.1.3. Monitor performance continuously 
3.1.4. Expand capability as necessary 
4. Cultivate the community 
4.1. Publicize the project 
4.1.1. Use immediately available spheres of influence 
4.1.2. Account for network externalities to spread project awareness 
4.1.3. Prevent over publicizing to point of overloading system. 
4.1.4. Track interest 
4.1.5. Broaden publicity if necessary 
4.2. Explain objectives, operating practices and procedures 
4.2.1. Define processes 
4.2.2. Define interactions between processes 
4.3. Establish benefits of contributing 
4.3.1. Individual benefits 
4.3.1.1. Learning 
4.3.1.2. Immediate monetary compensation 
4.3.1.3. Future employment 
4.3.1.4. Increased skills 
4.3.1.5. Documents performance 
4.3.1.6. Social rewards 
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4.3.1.7. Psychological rewards 
4.3.1.8. Hedonistic rewards 
4.3.2. Peer community benefits 
4.3.2.1. Learning 
4.3.2.2. Social 
4.3.2.3. Stimulate other businesses 
4.3.3. Project sponsor benefits 
4.3.3.1. Cost savings 
4.3.3.2. Increased efficiency 
4.3.3.3. Better product 
4.3.3.4. More satisfied employees 
4.3.3.5. Lower personnel turnover 
4.4. Synchronize with project implementation 
4.4.1. Project needs are consistent with anticipated community size 
4.4.2. Target community is consistent with project requirements 
4.4.3. Implementation promotes peer participation 
4.4.4. Implementation devalues hierarchical processes 
5. Propagate rewards 






5.2. Publicize contributions 
5.2.1. Within community 
5.2.2. To public 
5.2.3. To sponsors 
5.3. Facilitate job placement 
5.3.1. In future projects 
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5.3.2. Maintaining current project 
5.3.3. Recommendations for future employment 
5.3.4. Referral to hiring employers 





6. Integrate the results 
6.1. Validate each contribution 
6.1.1. Check for correctness 
6.1.1.1. Average out incorrect responses 
6.1.1.2. Manual expert check 
6.1.1.3. Test 
6.1.1.4. Peer review 
6.1.2. Check for appropriateness 
6.1.2.1. Solves a relevant problem 
6.1.2.2. Suggests a new innovation 
6.1.2.3. Addresses stated needs 
6.1.2.4. Addresses implied needs 
6.2. Incorporate contribution into whole 
6.2.1. Automatically through algorithm application 
6.2.2. Manually 
6.3. Distribute new whole to stakeholders as appropriate 
6.3.1. Make new version available 
6.3.2. Notify of its existence 
6.3.3. Publicize benefits 
6.3.4. Train on changes 
6.4. Distribute new whole to community as appropriate 
6.4.1. Make new version available 
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6.4.2. Notify of its existence 
6.4.3. Publicize changes 
6.4.4. State new problems 
6.4.5. Highlight contributors 
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